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Dignity, Legal Pluralism, 
and Same-Sex Marriage 
Jeffrey A. Redding† 
For the first time in living memory, we can realistically hope to see 
lesbian and gay couples happily joined on an equal footing with our 
non-gay brothers and sisters—if those who favor equality can put 
aside their divisions and unite to secure ultimate victory. For this 
reason, I have urged that we end, or at least suspend, the intra-
community debate over whether to seek marriage. The ship has 
sailed.1 
—Evan Wolfson (1993) 
Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.2 
—Proposition 8 (2008) 
  
 † Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Portions of this 
Article were presented previously at the American Society of Comparative Law’s 2008 
Annual Meeting, two symposia on California’s Proposition 8 at Chapman University 
School of Law during the 2008-09 academic year, and a faculty workshop at Saint 
Louis University’s School of Law. I thank participants at each forum for their questions 
and feedback, and also Mary Anne Case, Glenn Cohen, Katherine Darmer, Adrienne 
Davis, Moon Duchin, Chad Flanders, Holning Lau, Robert Leckey, Sebastian Lourido, 
Eric Miller, Doug Nejaime, Karen Petroski, Marc Poirier, Darren Rosenblum, Laura 
Rosenbury, Kerry Ryan, Pete Salsich, Molly Walker Wilson, and Robin Fretwell Wilson 
for especially insightful individual conversations and suggestions. Dallin Merrill, Kate 
Mortensen, and Kevin Salzman all provided excellent research assistance for this 
Article, as did the Saint Louis University Law Library staff (and especially Peggy 
McDermott). Both Yale’s Fund for Lesbian and Gay Studies (FLAGS) and Saint Louis 
University School of Law provided generous support for research leading to this 
Article. Of course, all errors of fact and judgment remain mine alone. This Article is 
dedicated to Rehaan Engineer, for never letting his dignity get in the way of his love. 
 1 Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians 
and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
567, 611 (1994). Evan Wolfson is Executive Director of the organization Freedom to 
Marry. See http://www.freedomtomarry.org/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). In 1993, he was 
writing in the wake of the Hawaii Supreme Court decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 
44 (Haw. 1993), which found that Hawaii’s prohibitions on same-sex marriage 
potentially violated the Hawaiian state Constitution’s guarantees of equality. Id. at 67. 
 2 Cal. Prop. 8 (2008) (codified as CAL. CONST. art. I § 1.5). Proposition 8 is 
also known as the California Marriage Protection Act, and it was approved by voter-
ballot initiative and enacted into law by Californians on November 4, 2008. For more 
information on Proposition 8, see http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/title-sum/prop8-
title-sum.htm.  
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There is a position—not at all unfamiliar in contemporary 
discussion—which says that to be a citizen is essentially and simply 
to be under the rule of the uniform law of a sovereign state. . . . 
[T]his is a very unsatisfactory account of political reality in modern 
societies.3 
—Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams (2008) 
American family law is in tumult, and that is a good 
thing. The debate over same-sex marriage has opened the 
floodgates of contestation, debate, and imagination over the 
regulation of interpersonal relationships in the United States.4 
The faltering of one major American taboo—that of same-sex 
intimacy—has encouraged citizens, activists, and lawyers to 
question other social and legal taboos and, also, to attempt to 
construct new ones. For example, active debates concerning 
whether the state might permit and regulate (or at least de-
criminalize) polygamy are now occurring,5 as are discussions 
concerning the wisdom of the state sponsoring marriage in the 
first place.6 Startling proposals to constitutionalize family law 
  
 3 See Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Civil and Religious Law in 
England: A Religious Perspective, Lecture at the Royal Courts of Justice (Feb. 7, 2008), 
available at www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575. 
 4 See Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex 
Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 1, 2 (2009) 
(arguing that “[t]he more American courts, and the American people, weigh in on same-
sex marriage, the more problematic the very concept of ‘marriage’ becomes”). 
 5 See, e.g., Michèle Alexandre, Lessons from Islamic Polygamy: A Case for 
Expanding the American Concept of Surviving Spouse So As to Include De Facto 
Polygamous Spouses, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461, 1461 (2007) (discussing the 
desirability of creating “legal remedies for vulnerable individuals living and operating 
in de facto polygamous unions”); Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery 
Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary 
Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1548 (2005) 
(questioning “the privileged position that the incest taboo has maintained in the law 
governing sexuality and the family . . . and [] propos[ing] that the law reappraise the 
extent to which disgust, rather than reasoned argument, sustains laws directed at 
sexual and familial choice”); Adrienne Davis, The Game of Love: Polygamy, Default 
Rules, and Bargaining for Equality (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-
09-01, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1480906; 
Emily J. Duncan, The Positive Effects of Legalizing Polygamy: “Love is a Many-
Splendored Thing”, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 315 (2008); Shayna M. Sigman, 
Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy is Wrong, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
101 (2006) (arguing against the criminalization of polygamy, but not necessarily for 
formal recognition by the state of polygamous relationships). 
 6 See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: 
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008); John G. Culhane, Marriage Equality? 
First, Justify Marriage (If You Can), 1 DREXEL L. REV. 485, 511 (2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428971 (asking “Which of 
marriages [sic] many benefits are justified, and to what extent? . . . How might we tie 
benefits and burdens to facts rather than to status?”); see also Melissa Murray, Equal 
Rites and Equal Rights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1395 (2008) (discussing the California 
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have been another consequence of the same-sex marriage 
debate.7 
American family law now has an energetic politics, 
which can only be a welcome development after years of 
widespread complacence towards an entrenched and encrusted 
mediocrity called “marriage.” It is no longer possible (nor has it 
ever been desirable) to wish an end to these family law debates, 
whether these debates occur within the gay and lesbian 
community, or without, and whether these debates concern 
same-sex marriage or its slippery-slope progeny. 
Moreover, like the United States itself, American family 
law does not exist in a nationalistic bubble in a globalized 
world. Indeed, the American discussion of same-sex marriage 
has always been an especially rich one, and has also 
maintained vitality in the face of great odds, because of this 
discussion’s transnational character. Defying the commonplace 
image of family and family law being exclusively domestic 
concerns, the gay, lesbian, and bisexual movement8 for same-
  
Supreme Court’s opening the door to the possibility that the State of California may 
create a new type of officially-recognized relationship, equally available to all people, 
which is not called “marriage”). 
 7 I am referring here specifically to amendments to the U.S. Constitution 
proposed in both the House of Representatives and Senate in 2005-06 which would 
have constitutionalized an opposite-sex definition of marriage for the United States. 
See, e.g., Marriage Protection Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 88, 109th Cong. (2006), 
Marriage Protection Amendment, S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005) (both proposing 
constitutional language that “[m]arriage in the United States shall consist only of the 
union of a man and a woman.”). 
 8 This movement is also known as the “LGBT” (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgendered) rights movement. This Article uses the expression “gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual” (or “gay and lesbian” as an unfortunately useful shorthand) instead of the 
more-inclusive “LGBT” terminology, since many of the issues concerning same-sex 
marriage are only occasionally issues for transgendered people. In this respect, 
“[s]ame-sex marriages already exist in the transgender community.” Phyllis Randolph 
Frye & Alyson Dodi Meiselman, Same-Sex Marriages Have Existed Legally in the 
United States for a Long Time Now, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2000). Same-sex 
marriages can arise in the transgendered community as a result of post-marital 
changes in the natal sex of one partner in an opposite-sex marital relationship. See 
generally Jennifer L. Levi, Marriage and Civil Unions, in REPRESENTING 
NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES (2006) (noting that there is a strong presumption of 
continuing legality of marriages in such situations since “[a]ll states abide by a strong 
public policy in favor of validating marriages, and an otherwise lawful marriage may 
only be terminated by death or divorce”). Same-sex marriages can also arise in the 
transgendered community when states refuse to legally recognize post-natal sex 
changes. As a consequence, “same-sex-appearing marriages,” Frye & Meiselman, 
supra, at 1033, can result when one person in an opposite-sex relationship transitions 
between sexes yet is still allowed to marry a partner of the “same” sex because the 
state refuses to legally recognize the sex change. This ironic result of the refusal of a 
state to permit/recognize post-natal changes in the legal sex of individuals can be found 
in Tennessee, Texas, Kansas, Florida, and Ohio. See Julie A. Greenberg, When Is a 
Same-Sex Marriage Legal? Full Faith and Credit and Sex Determination, 38 
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sex marriage has been an especially transnational one. For 
example, news of same-sex marriage developments in the 
Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, and elsewhere redounded 
quickly to the United States,9 and comparable developments in 
Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut now reverberate 
around the world.10 Yet, despite the transnational character of 
the same-sex marriage debates, rigorous transnational 
analyses with respect to some of the key concepts at play in 
today’s (and tomorrow’s) debates are few in number.11 
With this situation in mind, this Article’s goals are two-
fold and related, namely 1) to contribute to the radical re-
thinking of family law that is on-going in the contemporary 
United States by 2) analyzing recent U.S. developments with 
respect to same-sex marriage from a transnational perspective. 
In doing so, this Article argues against the odd and overstated 
quality of recent American state court discussions concerning 
the necessary relationship between dignity and family law 
pluralism. These discussions, and the conclusions that they 
have given rise to, have resulted not only in the erasure12 of 
  
CREIGHTON L. REV. 289, 296-98 (2005). Finally, and more theoretically, transgendered 
individuals may object to the entire methodology concerning the duality or even 
knowability of “sex” that is often deployed when gay and lesbian activists advocate for 
“same-sex” marriage. See Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People 
and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 220 (1997) (noting that “[b]oth the 
opponents and the proponents of same-sex marriage have generally assumed that 
‘same-sex marriage’ is equivalent to ‘gay or lesbian marriage’”). 
 9 See, e.g., N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMMISSION, THE LEGAL, MEDICAL, 
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF NEW JERSEY’S CIVIL UNION LAW 37 (2008) 
(discussing international developments in same-sex relationship-recognition); Anthony 
Deutsch, Dutch Lawmakers Make Marriage Legal for Gays, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 12, 
2000, at 3 (describing the enactment of a bill “converting the country’s ‘registered 
same-sex partnerships’ into full-fledged marriages” and giving gay couples “divorce 
guidelines” as well as “wider adoption rights”); Chris Rovzar, Spanish Lessons, THE 
ADVOCATE, Jan. 16, 2007, available at http://www.advocate.com/issue_story_ektid 
41071.asp; Michelangelo Signorile, Gay Marriage in U.S. Gets Boost, NEWSDAY, Jun. 
20, 2003 (describing recent same-sex marriage developments in Canada and their 
potential impact on the U.S.). 
 10 See, e.g., Sarah Beresford & Caroline Falkus, Abolishing Marriage: Can 
Civil Partnership Cover It?, 30 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2009) (discussing U.S. same-
sex marriage developments in the context of debates in the United Kingdom over the 
recognition of civil partnerships, as opposed to marriages, for same-sex couples); 
Tarunabh Khaitan, Beyond Reasonableness: A Rigorous Standard of Review for Article 
15 Infringement, 50 J. INDIAN L. INST. 177, 180 n.13 (2008) (mentioning California 
same-sex marriage litigation while arguing for a heightened standard of review in the 
enforcement of Indian constitutional equality norms). 
 11 POLIKOFF, supra note 6, at 110-22, provides a welcome exception to this 
general rule. 
 12 For example, in both Connecticut and New Hampshire, after the 
legalization of same-sex marriages in those two states, civil unions were automatically 
converted into “marriages.” See GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, QUESTIONS 
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profound and enviable gay and lesbian legal achievements—
“domestic partnerships,” “civil unions,” and the like—but also 
to a severe backlash in the form of Proposition 8 and similar 
state ballot initiatives. 
The conventional (liberal) view is that Proposition 8 and 
similar laws which create “separate but equal” relationship-
recognition regimes for homosexuals13 (as opposed to traditional 
heterosexual marriage) pose insurmountable affronts to gay 
and lesbian dignity. Using a transnational perspective and 
analysis, however, this Article proposes an alternative, more 
optimistic take on the relationship between dignity, same-sex 
marriage, and legal pluralism. Indeed, while the political 
campaign around Proposition 8 was heated and at times 
vitriolic, the ballot initiative ultimately returned California to a 
situation of family law pluralism, i.e. a situation where same-
sex and opposite-sex couples are each governed by different 
(family) laws. In this instance, these different family laws 
grant essentially the same rights and responsibilities to each 
sort of couple. As this Article argues, however, there are other 
possible results from maintaining a separate system of family 
law for gays and lesbians, namely the possibility of gay and 
lesbian people exercising agency with respect to the family laws 
which directly affect them. With this agency, gays and lesbians 
would have the possibility of experiencing something more 
than “separate but equal” family laws being applied to them. 
Indeed, gays and lesbians would have the opportunity to 
author—or, in other words, to exercise agency with respect to—
their own “separate and better” alternatives to (heterosexually-
  
AND ANSWERS ABOUT CONNECTICUT’S TRANSITION FROM CIVIL UNIONS TO MARRIAGE 4 
(2009), http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/ct-cu-to-marriage.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2010); Andrew J. Manuse, New Hampshire Legalizes Gay Marriage, REUTERS, 
Jun. 3, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5526NV20090603. 
In Vermont, after the legalization of same-sex marriage there in September, 2009, no 
new civil unions could be entered into, but existing civil unions were not automatically 
converted into marriages. See Vermont.com, Guide to Vermont Civil Marriage, 
http://www.vermont.com/civilmarriagefaq.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). 
  These examples suggest that William Eskridge’s optimistic prediction of 
the “sedimentary” effects of same-sex marriage laws has been somewhat disproved. See 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY 
RIGHTS 121 (2002) (“Each step toward same-sex marriage is typically (but not always) 
sedimentary: rather than displacing earlier reforms, the new reform simply adds 
another legal rule or institution on top of an earlier one.”); see also id. at 210, 218-19. 
 13 When this Article uses the term “homosexual,” it does so in the manner 
that one finds the term “heterosexual” being used, i.e. in a purely descriptive, generic, 
and non-judgmental manner. 
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authored) “majoritarian marriage.”14 These positive aspects to 
Proposition 8, and family law pluralism more generally, should 
not be overlooked, and this Article explores how they can be 
capitalized upon in a principled, dignity-oriented manner. 
In refusing to be defeated by either the hate or the 
hopelessness that has infused the debate over Proposition 8 
(and similar measures), this Article attempts to help the 
American gay and lesbian civil rights movement find a 
dignified way out of its current quagmire with (ostensibly) anti-
gay forces,15 and the costly and counter-productive war over 
same-sex marriage. The traditional civil rights paradigms and 
strategies disparaging “separate but equal”16 laws that this 
  
 14 For a more detailed discussion of how I understand and use the term 
“agency” in this Article, see infra Part III. 
 15 Many people who are working to preserve “marriage” for heterosexuals 
only would contest the assertion that they are “anti-gay,” arguing rather that they are 
simply “pro-traditional marriage.” I am not convinced by a great number of these 
people, and I believe that a certain virulent homophobia underlies much of their 
opposition to same-sex marriage. In this, I am in partial accord with Martha 
Nussbaum’s diagnostic (and critical) observations concerning “traditional marriage” 
arguments that implicitly or explicitly assume that “to associate traditional marriage 
with the sex acts of same-sex couples is to defile or contaminate [traditional marriage].” 
Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Marry? Same-sex Marriage and Constitutional Law, 
DISSENT (Summer 2009), available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article 
=1935. That being said, I also believe that many same-sex marriage advocates are less 
than homophilic, especially when they disparage activity that is typically ascribed to 
gay men (e.g. sexual promiscuity). For example, describing the factors that he thinks 
contributed historically to the gay and lesbian push for same-sex marriage rights, well-
known professor and same-sex marriage advocate William Eskridge has written:  
Whatever gravity gay life may have lacked in the disco seventies it acquired 
in the [AIDS] health crisis of the eighties. What it lost in youth and innocence 
it gained in dignity. Gay cruising and experimentation . . . gave way 
somewhat in the 1980s to a more lesbian-like interest in commitment. Since 
1981 and probably earlier, gays were civilizing themselves. Part of our self-
civilization has been an insistence on the right to marry. 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 58 (1996); see also 
David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call it Marriage”: The First Amendment and Marriage as an 
Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 943-44 (2001) (arguing that “[s]ame-sex 
couples, precluded by the mixed-sex requirement from using civil marriage to express 
the integrity of their sexuality, are . . . subjected to the ‘sex as lifestyle’ presumption”). 
 16 For previous examples of work that invokes arguments about the 
unconstitutionality of “separate but equal” family law institutions, using case law from 
previous civil rights struggles involving race and sex, see David Buckel, Government 
Affixes a Label of Inferiority on Same-Sex Couples When It Imposes Civil Unions and 
Denies Access to Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 73, 74 (2005); Barbara Cox, But 
Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont’s Civil Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and 
Separate but (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113 (2000); Michael Mello, For Today, I’m Gay: 
The Unfinished Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149, 156 
(2000); Mark Strasser, Mission Impossible: On Baker, Equal Benefits, and the 
Imposition of Stigma, 9 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1 (2000). All of these articles claim 
a parallel between the modern-day system of reserving “marriage” for heterosexuals, 
while granting “civil unions” or “domestic partnerships” to homosexuals, and the 
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movement heavily leans upon are not gaining widespread 
traction with respect to same-sex relationship recognition, even 
taking into account recent same-sex marriage developments in 
the District of Columbia, Iowa, and some Northeastern states.17 
Moreover, even if these paradigms were to gain more 
widespread currency, there are real harms to gay and lesbian 
agency—and, as a result, dignity—that accompany gay and 
lesbian absorption into majoritarian family law, and these 
harms should not be overlooked. 
Part I begins this Article with an exploration and 
excavation of two recent and important state supreme court 
judgments, from California and Connecticut, which exemplify 
the current state of mainstream liberal legal thinking with 
respect to the legalization of same-sex marriage. This Part 
focuses on how the crucial concept of “dignity” is deployed in 
these two legal decisions in support of the argument that gays 
and lesbians are denied dignity, and made second-class 
citizens, when the state recognizes dyadic, intimate, same-sex 
relationships differently than it does comparable opposite-sex 
relationships.18 According to both states’ supreme courts, any 
relationship-recognition system that grants heterosexuals the 
possibility of “marriage,” while only holding out “domestic 
partnerships” or “civil unions” to homosexuals, smacks of the 
now-repudiated idea that institutions can be “separate but 
equal.” 
Part II contests the California and Connecticut Supreme 
Courts’ understanding of how dignity and legal uniformity 
must necessarily be connected. It does so by broadening the 
discussion of dignity and family law to look at both outside of 
the United States. While liberal advocates in the United States 
have argued that transnational and comparative experience is 
relevant and important with respect to some of the leading 
  
nineteenth-century system of maintaining “separate but equal” railway cars for 
persons of different races, the constitutionality of which was upheld in the now widely-
disparaged U.S. Supreme Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 17 Marriage between same-sex partners is now legally available in five states: 
Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont. Lambda Legal, 
Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, http://www.lambdalegal.org/ 
publications/articles/nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships.html (last visited Feb. 
22, 2010). Same-sex marriage has also very recently become available in the District of 
Columbia. 
 18 This Article uses the conventional expression “opposite-sex relationships” 
to describe male-female pairings, but does not intend to endorse the view that there are 
only two sexes or that, even if there are, that they have to be configured as dyadic and 
“opposite.” 
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legal issues of the day,19 the ostensibly liberal California and 
Connecticut Supreme Court decisions are astonishing in their 
overwhelmingly domestic focus. Part II compensates for this 
lack by showing what a more rigorous transnational 
investigation centered on dignity and family law pluralism 
would unearth. The foreign jurisdictions examined in this Part 
include Canada, the United Kingdom, and India. As this Part 
discusses, in these national contexts, dignity and its conceptual 
cognates (e.g. respect, tolerance, minority rights) have been 
invoked not to amalgamate minorities into a unitary, common 
family law system but, instead, to provide minorities with legal 
space in which to implement non-majoritarian visions of 
family, community, and the good life. 
Part III brings the discussion back home, showing how a 
domestic consideration of transnational notions of dignity and 
family law pluralism could play out in the United States. 
Provocatively, this Part argues that the dignity of gay and 
lesbian people could be enhanced by a separate system of 
relationship-recognition and family law for same-sex unions. 
Such a separate system would create legislative space and 
freedom for the exercise of gay and lesbian agency, and the 
elaboration of “separate and better” alternatives to the 
straitjacket of majoritarian marriage. However, as this Part 
also discusses, in order for this potential to be realized, there 
will have to be transformations in the imagination and aims of 
the current gay and lesbian rights movement, as well as in the 
larger social and legal context in which this movement is 
situated.  
This Article thus ends by confronting squarely but 
confidently the reality of a twenty-first century United States—
one where same-sex marriage has little traction or 
instantiation, and one where conservatives’ success at 
colonizing family law more generally cannot be elided. Indeed, 
instead of perpetually lamenting this reality, this Part 
concludes by working to creatively generate new legal 
thinking20 which de-links the dignity of gay and lesbian people 
  
 19 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Federalism and 
Transnational Judicial Discourse, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 91, 92-93 (2004); WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 83 
(2002). 
 20 Of course, knowledge is (often) cumulative, and my arguments here clearly 
build off of a great deal of previous important work in queer theory, political theory, 
and even linguistics. For previous examples of work that has made similar—yet also 
quite different—points with respect to some of the arguments presented in this Article, 
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with majoritarian marriage and, instead, locates this dignity in 
the agency of gay and lesbian people with respect to their own 
lives, their own families, and their own laws. Indeed, one way 
of both inhabiting and expressing this agency, and dignity, 
would be to assert political and legislative control over a 
separate body of family law for gay and lesbian people and 
families. Such a move would not be motivated by compromise 
or capitulation,21 or utopian thinking, but by a deeply principled 
quest for dignity in a contemporary United States that has 
demonstrated its eager readiness to permit gays and lesbians 
to occupy a different legal arena than heterosexuals. With this 
  
see generally Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will?: Toward a Pluralist 
Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1573 (2009) 
(distinguishing opposite-sex and same-sex couples and “suggest[ing] a unique legal 
regime for the latter,” but primarily as an unfortunately necessary result of the fact 
that same-sex couples face “legal restrictions from getting married”); POLIKOFF, supra 
note 6; Douglas W. Allen, An Economic Assessment of Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 29 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 949, 980 (2006) (advocating but only briefly developing “a 
separate legal structure called ‘homosexual marriage’,” and doing so from a hetero-
centric perspective which valorizes “traditional marriage”); Marie A. Failinger, A Peace 
Proposal for the Same-Sex Marriage Wars: Restoring the Household to Its Proper Place, 
10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 195, 198 (2004) (characterizing same-sex marriage 
advocacy as “ultimately mimic[king] rather than resolv[ing] the problems with using 
the ‘choice’-based nuclear family as the favored legal model for ordering intimate 
relationships”); ESKRIDGE, supra note 12 (evincing interest in pluralistic “tailor-made 
regulatory regimes” for families but repeatedly characterizing any non-marital regime 
for same-sex partners as of a “compromise” nature); Barbara Stark, Marriage 
Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1479, 
1490-91 (2001) (diagnosing and expressing skepticism towards “metanarratives” about 
marriage); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Avoiding a Collision Course in Lesbian and Gay Family 
Advocacy, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 753, 758 (2000) (proposing a “continuum of 
family recognition options,” all of which would be open to both homosexuals and 
heterosexuals on the basis of formal equality); MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH 
NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999) (providing perhaps the 
most rousing and wide-ranging queer critique of same-sex marriage advocacy that has 
been made in the past many years). 
 21 While I am sympathetic to the proposals recently put forward by David 
Blankenhorn and Jonathan Rauch with respect to the legislation of a federal civil 
union regime—as distinguished from marriage—I would resist their characterization of 
this as a “compromise.” See David Blankenhorn & Jonathan Rauch, A Reconciliation on 
Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., How 
Government Unintentionally Influences Culture (The Case of Same-Sex Marriage), 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 495, 496 (2008) (identifying domestic partnerships as a “compromise” 
between same-sex marriage advocates and opponents); Nussbaum, supra note 15 
(identifying civil unions as a “compromise offer”). For more discussion on how principle 
can provide the foundation for belief in legal pluralism, see Martha Minow, Is 
Pluralism an Ideal or a Compromise?: An Essay for Carol Weisbrod, 40 CONN. L. REV. 
1287 (2007). For another articulation of the relationship between legal pluralism and 
higher ideals, see Katharine Bartlett’s argument that “in reducing the power of 
individuals to make their own family decisions, family-standardizing reform reduces 
the capacity of individuals to develop as moral beings.” Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving 
the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 817 (1998) (emphasis 
added). 
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in mind, this Article aims to imagine how gay and lesbian 
dignity might be enhanced rather than diminished by looking 
broadly, traveling widely, and viewing the world with 
curiousity and xenophilia, rather than dread and homophobia. 
I. CALIFORNIA AND CONNECTICUT 
Few expressions call forth the nod of assent and put an end to 
analysis as readily as “the dignity of man.”22 
—Bertram Morris (1946) 
This Part explains and explores two recent and 
important state supreme court judgments, from California and 
Connecticut, which exemplify the current state of mainstream 
liberal legal thinking with respect to the legalization of same-
sex marriage. This Part concentrates on these two state high 
court judgments because they are the most recent state 
supreme court judgments that explicitly invoke the concept of 
dignity in their resolution of the question presented in each 
case. By way of comparison, the recent Iowa Supreme Court 
judgment legalizing same-sex marriage in that state did not 
use the word “dignity” even once in its judgment.23 Prior to the 
California and Connecticut high court decisions, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts had issued an advisory opinion 
in 2004 to that state’s Senate on a question very similar to the 
one that both the California and Connecticut courts addressed 
in their opinions, namely the constitutionality of a state 
government naming officially-recognized, otherwise-equivalent 
same-sex relationships something different than “marriage.”24 
However, I do not discuss this opinion in detail in this Part 
because so much of the analysis in that opinion is relied upon 
and utilized by the California and Connecticut Supreme 
Courts.25 In the dual interests of brevity and currency, this Part 
  
 22 Bertram Morris, The Dignity of Man, 57 ETHICS 57, 57 (1946). 
 23 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 24 See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 
2004). Earlier, of course, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had issued its 
path-breaking opinion, Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), 
legalizing same-sex marriage in the first place. The concept of dignity played a role in 
this opinion as well, with the court declaring that “[t]he Massachusetts Constitution 
affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class 
citizens.” Id. at 948. 
 25 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 398 n.3 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan 
v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 417 (Conn. 2008).  
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focuses on these two most recent state supreme court opinions 
instead. 
In the spring of 2008, the California Supreme Court 
handed down its groundbreaking decision concerning same-sex 
marriage, In re Marriage Cases.26 In this case, the court was 
asked to decide whether California’s relationship-recognition 
system was consistent with the California state constitution’s 
protections of the right to marry and the right to equality.27 
Under this relationship-recognition system, “marriage” was 
reserved for opposite-sex couples, while same-sex couples had 
access only to a parallel “domestic partnership” regime.28 Like 
California, some other states had also created two parallel 
systems of family law within their borders,29 but California’s 
regime of separate laws for different sexual orientations was 
unusual in that it accorded domestic partners “virtually all of 
the same substantive legal benefits and privileges, and . . . 
legal obligations and duties . . . that California law affords to 
and imposes upon a married couple.”30 Accordingly, what the 
California Supreme Court had to decide in this case was 
whether California’s “separate but equal”31 family law system 
was constitutional under the California Constitution. 
Ultimately, the court held that this system was not 
constitutional, and that same-sex couples had to be given 
“marriage” licenses just like opposite-sex couples.32 
  
 26 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, superseded by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.  
 27 See id. at 400. 
 28 See id. at 409, 413. 
 29 For example, Hawaii has enacted a law concerning “reciprocal 
beneficiaries” and Wisconsin has adopted a form of “domestic partnership,” but neither 
scheme provides the same rights and obligations as “marriage,” or California’s 
expansive, marriage-like “domestic partnership” regime. See Lambda Legal, Status of 
Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/articles/ 
nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
 30 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 398. According to the court, nine 
differences remain between domestic partnerships and marriages in California. Id. at 
416-17 n.24. Some of these differences are arguably to the benefit of people entering 
into a domestic partnership, while others arguably impose burdens that people 
entering marriage do not face. An example of an advantage would be that domestic 
partnerships are easier to dissolve than marriages in California. An example of a 
burden placed solely on people wishing to enter a domestic partnership is the 
requirement that such people have a common residence. There is no such common-
residence requirement for people marrying. See id. 
 31 The court explicitly links California’s system of maintaining a “separate 
institution of domestic partnership,” id. at 445 (emphasis added), with the (ostensibly) 
historic practice of “relegat[ing] . . . racial minorities to separate and assertedly 
equivalent public facilities and institutions,” id. at 451 (emphasis added). 
 32 The court holds that California’s system was unconstitutional on both a 
“fundamental right to marry” and equal protection grounds. See id. at 419, 433-34, 452. 
802 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:3 
There are many groundbreaking and interesting aspects 
to this decision. For example, this decision represented the first 
instance of a state’s highest court applying a “strict scrutiny” 
standard to discrimination against gays and lesbians.33 The 
decision was also noteworthy in its contemplation of the 
possibility that the State of California might create a 
relationship regime—available to everyone—that would use a 
rubric other than “marriage.”34 Finally, and without any sense 
of irony, the court seemed to agree with the same-sex marriage 
advocates litigating this case that there existed a fundamental 
“right to remain in the closet” in the State of California.35 
As important as all of the above features of the 
California decision are, this Part concentrates on an aspect of 
the court’s decision that has remained under-examined in the 
academic literature, namely the court’s discussion of the 
  
 33 See id. at 441-42; see also Kenji Yoshino, Magisterial Conviction: Why the 
California Supreme Court Did More than Legalize Gay Marriage, SLATE, May 15, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2191530/ (discussing uniqueness of California Supreme Court 
opinion with respect to applying strict scrutiny standard to sexual orientation 
discrimination). 
 34 Wrote the court: 
When a statute’s differential treatment of separate categories of 
individuals is found to violate equal protection principles, a court must 
determine whether the constitutional violation should be eliminated or cured 
by extending to the previously excluded class the treatment or benefit that 
the statute affords to the included class, or alternatively should be remedied 
by withholding the benefit equally from both the previously included class 
and the excluded class. A court generally makes that determination by 
considering whether extending the benefit equally to both classes, or instead 
withholding it equally, would be most consistent with the likely intent of the 
Legislature, had that body recognized that unequal treatment was 
constitutionally impermissible. 
. . . [T]here can be no doubt that extending the designation of marriage 
to same-sex couples, rather than denying it to all couples, is the equal 
protection remedy that is most consistent with our state’s general legislative 
policy and preference. 
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 452-53; see also Melissa Murray, Remark, Equal 
Rites and Equal Rights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1395 (2008) (discussing the California 
Supreme Court’s opening the door to the possibility that the State of California may 
create a new type of officially-recognized relationship, equally available to all people, 
which is not called “marriage”). 
 35 The nomenclature for this right is mine, and it is a reaction to the court’s 
sympathy for the plaintiffs’ argument that “one consequence of the coexistence of two 
parallel types of familial relationships is that—in the numerous everyday . . . settings 
in which an individual is asked whether he or she ‘is married or single’—an individual 
who is a domestic partner and who accurately responds to the question by disclosing 
that status will . . . be disclosing his or her homosexual orientation.” In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d at 446. The court links this allegedly coercive disclosure to the 
fundamental right to privacy that is contained within California’s state constitution. 
See id. 
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concept of “dignity” and its relationship to pluralistic family 
law systems. The court’s words on the subject of how dignity 
relates to family law pluralism are worth quoting at length:  
One of the core elements of the right to establish an officially 
recognized family that is embodied in the California constitutional 
right to marry is a couple’s right to have their family relationship 
accorded dignity and respect equal to that accorded other officially 
recognized families, and assigning a different designation for the 
family relationship of same-sex couples while reserving the historic 
designation of “marriage” exclusively for opposite-sex couples poses 
at least a serious risk of denying the family relationship of same-sex 
couples such equal dignity and respect. 
. . . . 
. . . [R]etaining the designation of marriage exclusively for 
opposite-sex couples and providing only a separate and distinct 
designation for same-sex couples may well have the effect of 
perpetuating a more general premise—now emphatically rejected by 
this state—that gay individuals and same-sex couples are in some 
respects “second-class citizens” who may, under the law, be treated 
differently from, and less favorably than, heterosexual individuals or 
opposite-sex couples.36 
Like other parts of the court’s opinion, the court’s 
discussion of dignity here was groundbreaking, but perhaps in 
an unanticipated way. For many people outside of the United 
States (especially), the court’s equation of dignity and family 
law uniformity is revolutionary, but mainly because it seems so 
ahistorical and ungrounded in real-world experience. Part III 
will discuss these global family law experiences in more detail, 
and what they can tell us about the complicated relationship 
between dignity and family law pluralism. 
That being said, the reality of family law around the 
globe did not completely escape the court’s attention in its 
opinion. For example, when discussing the California Attorney 
General’s arguments pertaining to the historical definition of 
marriage,37 the court did observe that “until recently, there has 
been widespread societal disapproval and disparagement of 
  
 36 Id. at 400, 402. 
 37 Noted the court:  
The Attorney General and the Governor maintain . . . that because the 
institution of marriage traditionally (both in California and throughout most 
of the world) has been limited to a union between a man and a woman, any 
change in that status necessarily is a matter solely for the legislative process. 
Id. at 447-48. 
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homosexuality in many cultures” and that, as a result, the 
designation of marriage continues to apply only to a 
relationship between opposite-sex couples in the overwhelming 
majority of jurisdictions in the United States, and around the 
world.38 Furthermore, the court ably made use of a Canadian 
Supreme Court opinion when describing how the history of 
discrimination against gay people cautions against thinking 
that any separate and parallel family law system for them can 
be anything but discriminatory.39 Yet, as the next Part 
discusses, the court’s global vision in its decision was extremely 
partial, avoiding not only a deeper exploration of Canadian 
family law realities and debates, but similar ones pertaining to 
family law pluralism, dignity, and minority rights elsewhere. 
Less than six months after the California Supreme 
Court’s decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court followed with 
its own path-breaking opinion on same-sex marriage. In 
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health,40 the Connecticut 
Supreme Court decided whether—in the court’s own words—
Connecticut’s practice of “segregat[ing] heterosexual and 
homosexual couples into [the] separate institutions” of 
(respectively) “marriage” and “civil union” violated the 
Connecticut Constitution’s protections as to substantive due 
process and equality.41 Similar to California’s system of parallel 
  
 38 Id. at 451 n.70. 
 39 Noted the court: 
[P]articularly in light of the historic disparagement of and discrimination 
against gay persons, there is a very significant risk that retaining a 
distinction in nomenclature with regard to this most fundamental of 
relationships whereby the term “marriage” is denied only to same-sex couples 
inevitably will cause the new parallel institution that has been made 
available to those couples to be viewed as of a lesser stature than marriage 
and, in effect, as a mark of second-class citizenship. As the Canada Supreme 
Court observed in an analogous context: “One factor which may demonstrate 
that legislation that treats the claimant differently has the effect of 
demeaning the claimant’s dignity is the existence of pre-existing 
disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice, or vulnerability experienced by the 
individual or group at issue . . . . ‘It is logical to conclude that, in most cases, 
further differential treatment will contribute to the perpetuation or 
promotion of their unfair social characterization, and will have a more severe 
impact upon them, since they are already vulnerable.’” 
Id. at 445 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 
54-55 [¶ 68] (Can.)). 
 40 See generally Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 
2008).  
 41 Id. at 412. The Connecticut Supreme Court understands the Connecticut 
Constitution’s due process guarantee to incorporate the “the fundamental right to 
marry the person of [one’s] choice.” Id. at 413. 
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relationship-recognition, Connecticut’s civil union scheme 
“conferred on [civil] unions all the rights and privileges that 
are granted to spouses in a marriage.”42  
As with the California opinion which shortly preceded 
it, there were many interesting aspects to the Connecticut 
opinion. For example, like the opinion from California, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court (following plaintiffs’ example)43 
used language evocative of the struggle for African-American 
civil rights when characterizing the parallel relationship 
recognition regime in Connecticut as involving “segregation.”44 
In addition, like the California court, the Connecticut court also 
decided to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to sexual 
orientation classifications contained in law. In this respect, the 
court found that any sexual orientation classifications that a 
law may use are “quasi-suspect” and deserve “intermediate 
scrutiny,”45 i.e. more scrutiny than “rational basis” review but 
less than the “strict scrutiny” that the California Supreme 
  
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 413. 
 44 See supra text accompanying note 40. The plaintiffs also had a slightly 
different argument, based on sex-segregation. As the court characterized their claims:  
[T]he plaintiffs maintained that, by limiting marriage to the union of a man 
and a woman, [the Connecticut] statutory scheme impermissibly segregates 
on the basis of sex. . . . The plaintiffs contended that [Connecticut’s] statutes 
contravene the state constitutional prohibition against sex discrimination 
because these statutes preclude a woman from doing what a man may do, 
namely, marry a woman, and preclude a man from doing what a woman may 
do, namely, marry a man. 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 414 (emphasis added).  
 45 See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412. There exists quite a bit of irony in the 
constitutional methodology that the court deploys to justify its use of an intermediate 
level of scrutiny here. In this respect, while the court wields an age-old, unchanging, 
and overly-valorized institution of marriage throughout much of its opinion, the court 
holds much more flexible ideas about a constitution and its changing contours. For the 
court, when interpreting a constitution (such as Connecticut’s), it is important to 
interpret it “in accordance with the demands of modern society” such that it will not 
remain “static [and] incapable of coping with changing times.” Id. at 420-21 (quoting 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819); State v. Dukes, 457 A.2d 
10, 19 (Conn. 1988)). The court needed to take this flexible approach to 
constitutionalism because the Connecticut state constitution does not explicitly forbid 
sexual orientation discrimination yet, with its opinion, the court intended to extend 
intermediate scrutiny to legislation specifically distinguishing gay and lesbian people. 
See Kerringan, 957 A.2d at 425. As a result, however, marriage becomes more of a 
bedrock, foundational institution in Connecticut than even the Connecticut 
constitution itself. In this way, the Connecticut opinion is somewhat different than 
state court opinions that have used the “post-legal” (as opposed to “pre-legal”) status of 
marriage in the process of arguing against the inclusion of same-sex couples within 
“marriage.” For examples and discussion of such state court opinions, see generally 
Abrams & Brooks, supra note 4, at 20-28. 
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Court decided to exercise in relation to sexual orientation 
discrimination.  
However, the strongest parallels between the 
Connecticut Supreme Court and the California Supreme 
Court’s opinion were perhaps those found in the Connecticut 
court’s holding that the denial of “real”46 marriage to same-sex 
couples implicated the dignity interests of these couples, and 
also homosexual individuals more generally.47 Indeed, the 
parallels could hardly be stronger, given that the Connecticut 
court largely relied on cutting-and-pasting from the California 
decision (and prior ones from Massachusetts) in the portions of 
its opinion dealing with the dignity question.48 
When speaking for itself on the dignity question, the 
Connecticut high court found that the basic equality that 
Connecticut had legislated between marriage and civil unions 
was constitutionally defective because these different 
institutions did not operate in a historical vacuum. According 
to the court, “[a]lthough marriage and civil unions do embody 
the same legal rights under our law, they are by no means 
‘equal.’ . . . [T]he former is an institution of transcendent 
historical, cultural and social significance, whereas the latter 
most surely is not.”49  
With respect to this asserted significance for marriage, 
and echoing plaintiffs’ claim that marriage—more so than civil 
unions—is “special,”50 the Connecticut Supreme Court’s opinion 
explained in detail the unique and vital role that it believed 
marriage plays in the contemporary American polity. To do so, 
the opinion again relied heavily on quotations and citations 
  
 46 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 417. 
 47 See id. at 417-18, 465-74. It should also be noted that the Connecticut 
Supreme Court is also worried about how the withholding of “marriage” from same-sex 
couples affects the well-being of any children such couples have. The court wrote: 
[T]he ban on same sex marriage is likely to have an especially deleterious 
effect on the children of same sex couples. A primary reason why many same 
sex couples wish to marry is so that their children can feel secure in knowing 
that their parents’ relationships are as valid and as valued as the marital 
relationships of their friends’ parents. 
Id. at 474. For more on this harm to children, see also id. at 475 n.77. 
 48 See id. at 417-18, 471-75 for the Connecticut Supreme Court’s use of 
lengthy quotations from In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 
2004); and Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 49 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 418. 
 50 Id. at 416 (“[Plaintiffs] contend that [marriage] is an institution of unique 
and enduring importance in our society, one that carries with it a special status.”). 
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from other U.S. courts. Following these other courts’ lead, then, 
the Connecticut court alternatively characterized marriage as 
“fundamental to our very existence and survival,”51 “intimate to 
the degree of being sacred,”52 and, citing a more ancient yet less 
hyperbolic precedent, “one of the most fundamental of human 
relationships.”53  
As a result of this remarkably (and perhaps uniquely) 
esteemed institutional history (for marriage), the withholding 
of the “marriage” nomenclature from same-sex couplings 
became acutely problematic for the court, especially given the 
fact that “historically [gays and lesbians have] been the object 
of scorn, intolerance, ridicule or worse.”54 Indeed, as a 
consequence of this historic stigmatization, the court believed 
that the separate legislation of civil unions could only be 
popularly perceived as “an official state policy that [civil unions 
are] inferior to marriage, and that the committed relationships 
of same sex couples are of a lesser stature than comparable 
relationships of opposite sex couples.”55 
Given these concerns, it should come as no surprise 
that, using its intermediate level of scrutiny, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court ultimately determined that Connecticut’s 
relationship-recognition scheme violated the Connecticut 
Constitution’s equality protections. In doing so, the court 
stressed the “overriding similarities” between opposite-sex and 
same-sex couples,56 with gay and lesbian people “shar[ing] the 
same interest in a committed and loving relationship as 
heterosexual persons who wish to marry, and . . . shar[ing] the 
same interest in having a family and raising their children in a 
loving and supportive environment.”57 Given this asserted58 
fundamental equivalence between same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples, it became inescapable that the court would declare 
that “firmly established equal protection principles lead[] 
  
 51 Id. (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). 
 52 Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). 
 53 Id. at 417 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 175 A. 574, 577 (Conn. 1934)). 
 54 Id. at 418. 
 55 Id. at 475. 
 56 Id. at 424. 
 57 Id. 
 58 I use this word to indicate the unempirical nature of the court’s findings in 
this respect. For evidence of significant differences between same-sex and opposite-sex 
marriages, see Scott James, Many Successful Gay Marriages Share an Open Secret, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at A17 (discussing widespread prevalence of non-
monogamous marriages within the gay and lesbian community), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/29sfmetro.html. 
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inevitably to the conclusion that gay persons are entitled to 
marry the otherwise qualified same sex partner of their 
choice. . . . [S]ame sex couples cannot be denied the freedom to 
marry.”59 
The Connecticut Supreme Court’s opinion thus reached 
the same basic conclusion as that of the California Supreme 
Court, while also using some of the same tools that the 
California court used (e.g. heightened scrutiny, the segregation 
metaphor). One remarkable difference between the two 
decisions, however, was that the Connecticut opinion never 
discussed non-U.S. legal or political experience. As discussed 
above, the California opinion did discuss and utilize such 
experience, but in an ungrounded and distorted manner. The 
next Part engages in a different reading of transnational legal 
experience with respect to the issue of how dignity and family 
law pluralism can relate to each other. 
II. DIGNITY AND FAMILY LAW PLURALISM, 
TRANSNATIONALLY-SPEAKING 
Q: If you got married [in the United Kingdom], would you have a 
civil marriage as well as a nikah [Muslim religious marriage]? 
A. I would have a civil marriage; I don’t know if it is more sort of a 
tradition thing that happens now; you have your nikah, and then 
you have your civil marriage as well. 
Q: Is there any other reason apart from the fact that it is what 
everyone else does? 
A: No. 
Q: Can you think of any reasons why you would want a civil 
marriage? 
A: No.60 
—Interview by Sonia Nurin Shah-Kazemi 
of a young Muslim woman in the United Kingdom (2001) 
A. Introduction 
California and Connecticut (and Massachusetts before 
them) clearly see family law pluralism—in particular, 
  
 59 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 482. 
 60 SONIA NURIN SHAH-KAZEMI, UNTYING THE KNOT: MUSLIM WOMEN, 
DIVORCE, AND THE SHARIAH 33 (2001). 
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pluralism with respect to the law of relationship-recognition—
as implicating dignity concerns. For both state high courts, 
state-recognized “marriage” is the path to dignity, and gay and 
lesbian people are necessarily forced into second-class 
citizenship if the majority’s family law conventions are not 
opened up to them. 
The choice by both the California and Connecticut 
Supreme Courts to invoke the language of dignity is important 
because, in the contemporary world, dignity is readily 
associated with the discourse of human rights. This is not to 
say that dignity has not featured in American constitutional 
discourse concerning civil rights—it most certainly has61—but it 
is to say that, in today’s world, “dignity” is more easily 
conjoined with “human” than it is with any particular sub-
species of humanity.62 In other words, one speaks more easily of 
“human dignity” than one does “American dignity” or 
“European dignity” or “Indian dignity.”63 Moreover, to say that 
  
 61 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (stating that the 
“dignity of man” underlies the Eighth Amendment and protects individuals from 
punishments that exceed current “civilized standards”). Dignity has also featured in 
American jurisprudential discussions of federalism. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. 
State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). In this case, concerning the constitutionality of 
a U.S. government agency’s administrative hearing of a complaint by a private 
company against a South Carolina government agency’s decision, the U.S. Supreme 
Court wrote: “The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States 
the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.” Id. at 760 
(emphasis added). This was not the first time that the Court recognized dignitary 
interests in upholding (a certain view of) states’ sovereignty rights. See, e.g., Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999); Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887). However, it 
is one of the most recent and strongest statements as to those interests in the modern 
period. For an overview of how dignity has been deployed in U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, see generally Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2005). 
 62 Some may disagree, but it is striking to note the regular invocation of the 
larger expression “human dignity” in any number of articles, rather than the simpler 
term “dignity.” For example, Maxine Goodman’s article, supra note 61, is entitled 
“Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence” when it might 
(conceivably) have been entitled simply “Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional 
Jurisprudence.” Interestingly, even Neomi Rao finds the use of the term “human 
dignity” seemingly inescapable, even while trying to parochialize the concept. For 
example, she writes: “Perhaps we should direct our attention to developing an 
American conception of human dignity based on the Constitution as well as on our legal 
traditions.” See Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 255 (2008) (emphasis added) (proposing and arguing for an 
American legal definition of dignity that would differ from prevailing notions of dignity 
commonly deployed in European legal argumentation). 
 63 But see Rao, supra note 62; James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures 
of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004) (finding a European 
conception of “personal dignity” which is tightly linked to the somewhat peculiar 
European ideas that one has “rights to one’s image, name, and reputation”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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“dignity” is compromised by a particular law or legal 
framework suggests that one’s analysis in this respect can and 
should be extended to all of humanity.64 
As this Part demonstrates, however, it is difficult to 
claim that “separate but equal” family law regimes necessarily 
implicate the dignity interests of minorities or “second-class 
citizens”65 if one looks globally at all of humanity. In particular, 
countries that implement family law via “personal law”66 often 
do so either to affirmatively pursue multiculturalist legal 
policies, or do so in response to concerns (and resistance) from 
minorities about efforts to coerce them into majoritarian 
understandings of family, community, and the good life. 
Additionally, even in countries that legislate and enforce family 
law in a manner resembling more closely American-style 
family law, increasingly there are efforts to allow (religious) 
minorities to pursue alternative visions of family via non-state 
arbitration of family law matters. This Part will look at both 
kinds of countries, broadening the discussion of dignity and 
legal pluralism to take account of legal realities and 
developments in places as diverse as Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and India. 
This Part’s selection of countries from which one can 
learn more about dignity and family law pluralism benefits 
from being diverse and broad-based, instead of narrow and 
unrepresentative of the world’s different cultural and legal 
traditions. The selection of Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
India as case-studies is also beneficial because, like the United 
States, each country is (proudly) a multi-ethnic, multi-religious 
democracy where debates over minority rights and cultural 
rights are common and longstanding. In other words, each of 
these three countries has a great deal of experience with “the 
dignity question,” and each of these countries has struggled 
with the reality of a diverse population that does not possess 
any single notion of “the good life.” Indeed, compared to these 
three countries, the United States is somewhat of a latecomer 
to discussions concerning dignity and family law pluralism.67 
  
 64 See generally Menachem Mautner, From “Honor” to “Dignity”: How Should 
a Liberal State Treat Non-Liberal Cultural Groups?, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 
609, 626 (2008) (discussing link between universal human rights and human dignity). 
 65 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 66 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 67 I say “somewhat” here keeping in mind that it was American-style 
federalism itself that created the opportunity for both California and Connecticut to 
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It should be emphasized from the outset that the claim 
of this Part is not that the dignity argument with respect to 
American gays and lesbians is wrong per se.68 The point, 
instead, is to highlight the fact that the dignity claim is a far-
more-complicated one than it is typically made out to be by 
American lawyers and judges. This being the case, it is hoped 
that by stripping the dignity claim of its veneer of obviousness, 
it will be possible to see why the claim very much might be 
incorrect. Essentially, after peeling away some of the self-
righteous rhetoric that provides both swords and shields for all 
sides in the same-sex marriage debates, this Part hopes to 
show how the dignity claim does not (conceptually or 
experientially) necessarily win the battle for same-sex 
marriage advocates. However, it does not lose it for them 
either. Finally, it should also be noted that many people feel 
that supporters of Proposition 8 acted in quite an undignified 
manner in the advertising campaign leading up to the 
California vote.69 Both sides of the debate have their difficulties 
with dignity. 
  
develop family law systems different than that found in New York, namely systems in 
which “marriage” and its homosexual sidekicks (i.e. “domestic partnerships” and “civil 
unions”) differed minimally in economic and legal benefits. There is a common 
inability, however, in American discussions of family law pluralism to conceive of this 
pluralism at a level different than that of the 50 states. 
 68 Clearly, the fact that religious minorities around the world are not using 
dignity claims to argue for their amalgamation into majoritarian marital and family 
law does not necessarily preclude gays and lesbians in the United States from—
correctly—doing so. There are real differences between other countries’ religious 
minorities and America’s sexual minorities, and also the histories of the family law 
systems that govern in each country. For one, many religions have had family law 
traditions that predate secular states and secular norms by centuries. Gays and 
lesbians, on the other hand, have often been excluded or excommunicated from the 
family altogether. It would not be surprising if each kind of community or cultural 
grouping sees different things in the family, and needs different things to feel “whole” 
or dignified. That being said, it would be a mistake to believe that American sexual 
minorities, to the extent that they do feel socially excluded, all necessarily view 
“marriage” as the antidote for that feeling of exclusion. It is also another question 
altogether whether such an antidote is necessarily the proper one for the future (as 
opposed to now). In this respect, it is my hope that the non-American family law 
examples discussed in this Article will incite a great deal of future exploration of 
dignified alternatives to majoritarian marriage. These possible alternatives are 
presently being ignored by mainstream actors in the American same-sex marriage 
debates. 
  For more on the cultural and legal obstacles that American gays and 
lesbians face with respect to imagining themselves like a (religious) “community” or 
“culture” with attendant legal rights and privileges, see infra Part III. 
 69 See, e.g., Andy Birkey, Kersten’s ‘Bullying Tactics’ Unhelpful to Gay Marriage 
Debate, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 26, 2010, available at http://www.startribune. 
com/yourvoices/82763402.html?elr=KARKSUUUODEY3LGDI07; E.J. Schultz, Prop. 8 
TV Ad Raises Questions: Controversy Swirls Around the Teaching of Gay Marriage in 
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This Part begins with a discussion of how the question 
of dignity has played out in recent debates over family law 
pluralism in Canada and the United Kingdom. It then moves to 
a discussion of “personal law” and dignity, in the paradigmatic 
(but not exhaustive) instance of India. The latter discussion is 
important because, whether known to Americans or not, the 
family law situation that is emerging in the United States 
(both before and after Proposition 8) strongly resembles a 
personal law system, i.e., a system of legal organization 
whereby different communities possess different laws within a 
given field of law (e.g. family law).70 The lessons concerning 
dignity that the Indian system provides are thus quite 
instructive. 
B. Private Ordering, Family Law Arbitration, and Dignity 
This section will discuss two jurisdictions relatively 
familiar to the American lawyer—Canada71 and the United 
Kingdom—where religious minorities have used or are using 
non-state court arbitration (and “alternative dispute 
resolution” more broadly) to enforce family law norms that 
differ from those which are legislated by the state and enforced 
in state courts. In the academic literature, one commonly sees 
arbitration referred to as a type of “private ordering” of family 
law.72 
  
School Classrooms, THE FRESNO BEE, Oct. 15, 2008, available at http://www.fresnobee. 
com/2008/10/14/937113/prop-8-tv-ad-raises-questions.html; John Wildermuth, Prop. 8 
Supporters Fight Fierce TV Ad Battle, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 11, 2008, available at http:// 
articles.sfgate.com/2008-10-11/news/17134454_1_same-sex-marriage-ban-gay-marriage.  
 70 Traditionally, personal law has been viewed as a kind of legal system that 
shares little with territorially-premised legal systems. I believe this view of things is 
wrong, however. See generally Jeffrey A. Redding, Slicing the American Pie: Federalism 
and Personal Law, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 941 (2008). Indeed, in light of the 
pattern in U.S. state laws which is emerging with respect to the definition and 
enforcement of marriages versus domestic partnerships (or civil unions), it is time to 
question any easy conclusion about the existence of sharp differences between the 
American system of family law and Indian personal law. Indeed, just as Muslims and 
Hindus form families according to different laws in India, now so do homosexuals and 
heterosexuals utilize different family laws in some American states. 
 71 The particular jurisdiction within Canada that I will be focusing on here is 
that of Ontario. However, some of this discussion necessarily implicates discussion 
about Canada as a whole. Thus, depending on the situation, I will sometimes 
specifically refer to “Ontario,” and other times to “Canada” more generally. 
 72 See generally Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale 
from Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 573 (2008). 
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Arbitration, like personal law,73 results in family law 
pluralism. However, arbitration differs from personal law in 
that the family law pluralism that results in a personal law 
system is (arguably) more dependent on, and more the creation 
of, the state. Arbitration, on the other hand, is imagined as 
existing “outside” of the state, and as providing an “alternative” 
to the state’s monolithic rules.74 In this way, arbitration 
potentially allows for even greater family law pluralism than a 
personal law system does, as the potential variation in family 
law rules corresponds to the (larger) diversity found amongst 
cognizable couples (as opposed to cognizable communities) in 
society. 
In 2003, Canadian politics become preoccupied with the 
issue of family law pluralism and, in particular, efforts by the 
Ontario-based Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (IICJ) to offer 
religiously-premised family law arbitration services to Muslims 
in Canada’s Ontario province. At the time, the president of this 
organization, Syed Mumtaz Ali, was said to have suggested 
that Canadian Muslims would not be “good Muslims” if they 
did not choose to have their family law issues decided outside 
of the secular Canadian legal system and according to Islamic 
law.75 As one can imagine, coming as they did so soon after 9/11, 
  
 73 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 74 As the Ontario “Boyd Report” described it:  
[D]isputants may . . . give up on the quest for an agreed resolution to the[ir] 
dispute, and choose instead to have a neutral third party decide the[ir] 
dispute. When this is done by agreement of the parties to the dispute, it is 
known as arbitration. . . . [Arbitration is] private; [it does] not depend on “the 
law” to make [it] work, and [it does] not involve any governmental or state 
action.  
MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING 
INCLUSION 9-10 (2004) [hereinafter Boyd Report]; see also Shachar, supra note 72, at 
580-81 (noting the difference between “calls for fair and just inclusion in the public 
sphere—the latter vividly captured by Iris Young’s image of a ‘heterogeneous public, in 
which persons stand forth with their differences acknowledged and respected’” and 
“claims for opting out of, or seceding from, the effects of the polity’s public laws and 
norms. Let us call the former pattern of multicultural inclusion public accommodation, 
and the latter, privatized diversity.”).  
 75 Boyd Report, supra note 74, at 3 (interpreting a news report of Syed 
Mumtaz Ali’s comments at a conference); see also Judy Van Rhijn, First Steps Taken 
for Islamic Arbitration Board, LAW TIMES, Nov. 25, 2003, available at http://www. 
freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1028843/posts. Prior to this 2003 conference, in a 1995 
interview, Mr. Ali had also declared that  
[a]s Canadian Muslims, you have a clear choice. Do you want to govern 
yourself by the personal law of your own religion, or do you prefer governance 
by secular Canadian family law? If you choose the latter, then you cannot 
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such efforts and statements struck a nerve in both secular and 
religious Canada, and much public controversy ensued.76 While 
a great deal of this controversy was the result of Islamophobic 
and/or racist sentiment,77 and overlooked the fact that Ontario 
Jews and Christians both had been using religiously-informed, 
legally-sanctioned arbitration to resolve their family law 
disputes for years,78 it nonetheless represented a serious crisis 
for the Ontario government. As a result, a special report was 
commissioned by the provincial Government of Ontario in 
2004, and this report, known as “the Boyd Report,” was issued 
at the end of 2004.79 An examination of the Boyd Report’s 
discussion is instructive and important here, as this discussion 
demonstrates the existence of differing visions of the 
relationship between dignity and family law pluralism than 
those articulated by the California and Connecticut Supreme 
Courts. 
At the time of the controversy, Ontario’s Arbitration 
Act80 could be used to arbitrate a variety of family law 
(including inheritance) disputes outside of the courts, according 
to any body of law that the parties to the dispute chose. Certain 
  
claim that you believe in Islam as a religion and a complete code of life 
actualized by a Prophet who you believe to be a mercy to all.  
Interview by Rabia Mills with Syed Mumtaz Ali, President, Canadian Society of 
Muslims (Aug. 1995), http://muslim-canada.org/pfl.htm. That being said, Syed Mumtaz 
Ali’s organization, the Canadian Society of Muslims, also stated in 2003 that 
[o]nce [a] matter comes to [Muslim arbitration,] the parties will be free to 
choose the law that they wish to rely upon. This model will not exclude 
application of Canadian laws if the parties wish to do so. It is expected that 
the Muslim Law and associated Case Law created through the old Anglo-
Mohammadan Law precedents would be the model for Personal Law cases 
initially, but any other Fiqh could also be relied upon if the parties so desire. 
Darul-Qada: Beginnings of Muslim Civil Justice System in Canada, CAN. SOC’Y 
MUSLIMS NEWS BULL., Apr. 2003, available at http://muslim-canada.org/news03.html. 
 76 See infra note 97. 
 77 The Boyd Report acknowledges this explicitly. See Boyd Report, supra note 
74, at 68. 
 78 See id. at 55-57. This report notes that representatives of one Jewish 
organization providing family law arbitration services told investigators for the report 
that Orthodox Jews are forbidden by their religion from bringing their legal disputes 
before “secular judges.” Id. at 55. The report also received a submission from one 
Christian organization (the Christian Legal Fellowship) representing hundreds of 
Christian lawyers, law professors, and law students, in which it was noted that 
“[m]any [faith] communities may feel that their core values, including the sanctity of 
the nuclear family are threatened by having their disputes resolved outside of their 
faith community by persons having no familiarity with their belief system.” Id. at 56. 
 79 See id. 
 80 Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 17 (1991), available at http://www.e-laws.gov. 
on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_91a17_e.htm#BK3. 
2010] DIGNITY, LEGAL PLURALISM, AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 815 
family law issues were outside of the power of an arbitrator to 
decide in a legally binding manner, including the basic status 
of a marriage (i.e. an arbitrator cannot declare a divorce; only a 
civil court can) and the custody of any children.81 However, 
disputes pertaining to spousal division of property, spousal 
support, child support, and inheritance could all be 
conclusively decided outside of the state’s courts,82 in front of 
any kind of arbitrator (e.g. a Jewish rabbi, or a Muslim imam), 
according to any body of law (religious or otherwise).83 
In the recommendations it laid out with respect to how 
religious family law arbitration should proceed in Ontario in 
the future, the Boyd Report attempted to walk a careful path 
between the possibility of two different kinds of legal regimes, 
each of which the report found extreme and undesirable. The 
first of these regimes the Boyd Report called “secular 
absolutism,” and it identified this type of legal system with the 
legal regime presently found in France.84 Under a “secular 
absolutist” system, “the state must abstain from any 
involvement in religious matters, and religious authorities 
must be prohibited from having any authority whatsoever over 
matters that are regulated elsewhere by state law,” including, 
presumably, family law.85 Under such a (secular) system of law, 
the state is where the definition and enforcement of one family 
law, for everyone, both begins and ends. 
The other extreme to be avoided, according to the Boyd 
Report, is a system whereby any group, such as Canadian 
Muslims, is allowed to establish a “separate” legal regime 
“distinct from [that of] the rest of Canadians, with the goal of 
political autonomy for the . . . community in this country.”86 
Such a system is problematic because  
Ontarians do not subscribe to the notion of “separate but equal” 
when it comes to the laws that apply to us. . . . A policy of compelling 
people to submit to different legal regimes on the basis of religion or 
culture would be counter to [Canadian] Charter values. . . . Equality 
before and under the law, and the existence of a single legal regime 
  
 81 See generally Boyd Report, supra note 74, at 14, 16. 
 82 See generally id. at 11-28. 
 83 See generally id. at 12, for a discussion of parties’ freedom to choose both 
the arbitrator and the body of law which would apply to the resolution of their dispute. 
 84 Id. at 89. 
 85 Id. (emphasis added). 
 86 Id.  
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available to all Ontarians are the cornerstones of our liberal 
democratic society.87 
While invoking the talismanic vocabulary of “separate 
but equal” to decry any extreme form of family law pluralism, 
the Boyd Report’s observations as to the desirability of family 
law uniformity were clearly agonized, and perhaps ambivalent. 
The report, for example, was forced to acknowledge—as any 
contemporary Canadian discussion of Canadian legal pluralism 
would have to—that Canada has a rich tradition of “separate 
but equal” legal regimes, most notably in historically-
francophone Quebec and also the aboriginal First Nations 
territories. With respect to the legal situation of Quebec, the 
report noted how 
the historical context clarifies why Britain tolerated the use of the 
French civil law in Quebec after defeating the French and why that 
system of law was continued in our Constitution. Indeed, Canada is 
a delicate balancing act where protection of the religious, language 
and legal rights of both French and English have marked our ethos 
from the beginning.88 
With respect to the First Nations and their legal 
particularity in the Canadian set-up, the Boyd Report was even 
more adamant—and, as a result, also more tortured—about the 
inapplicability of this “separate but equal” legal situation for 
any claim to an autonomous, religiously-premised and religion-
controlled89 system of (family) law for Muslims, or any other 
non-First Nations group:  
To compare any group of people, whether they are distinct on a 
cultural, ethnic or religious basis, to the First Nations of Canada in 
this country’s legal and historical context reveals a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the relationship between the 
Canadian state and the First Nations. From [this report’s] 
perspective, comparisons in this direction are erroneous at best.90 
Ultimately, the report’s legal conclusions here, to their 
detriment, rested on arguments about the First Nations’ 
singularity in Canada’s Constitution Act and other important 
  
 87 Id. at 88 (emphasis added). 
 88 Id. at 79. 
 89 As the Boyd Report describes this model: “According to such a conception of 
minority rights, the Muslim community, and other communities arbitrating family law 
matters using religious principles, would be able to do so based on whatever internal 
rules they adopt and the state would have no right to intervene.” Id. at 90. 
 90 Id. at 87-88. 
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legislation.91 Perhaps at the time of this report’s writing, this 
kind of argument looked like an unimpeachable and ingenuous 
one. Now, however, in light of American same-sex marriage 
opponents’ invocation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth 
Amendment’s historical rooting in anti-racism—and only anti-
racism92—the Boyd Report’s similar mode of argumentation 
looks intellectually half-hearted at best, and desperate and 
Islamophobic at worst. 
Ultimately, the Boyd Report ended up endorsing the 
basic system of optional arbitration for select family law 
matters that then existed in Ontario, while making suggestions 
on the margins for reforms to this system.93 As the report saw 
it, the benefits of this existing system included that it was 
consistent with the basic Canadian commitment to 
multicultural policies, which “[a]llow[] and support[] 
communities’ and individuals’ links to cultures (including their 
  
 91 Id. at 87. 
 92 See, for example, Lynn Wardle’s argument that 
[w]hatever else may be said about the Fourteenth Amendment, it is 
undeniable from both its text and its history that it was intended to outlaw 
state action designed to foster racism—to outlaw government policies that 
manifest the demeaning notion of racial inferiority. Three constitutional 
amendments especially embrace the value of racial equality in our legal 
system. By contrast, nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment discloses a 
comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of 
homosexual relations. 
Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 
1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 78-79 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 93 The Boyd Report noted that it 
did not find any evidence to suggest that women are being systematically 
discriminated against as a result of arbitration of family law issues. 
Therefore the Review supports the continued use of arbitration to resolve 
family law matters . . . . The Arbitration Act should continue to allow disputes 
to be arbitrated using religious law, if the safeguards currently prescribed and 
recommended by this Review are observed. 
Boyd Report, supra note 74, at 133. Many of the reforms suggested by the Boyd Report 
are relatively minor, such as requiring arbitrators to provide written reasons for their 
decisions and to keep and transmit to the government better written records of their 
decisions. Id. at 140. Some recommendations are more significant, such as the 
recommendation to require that the agreement to arbitrate a family dispute be 
reconfirmed at the time of the family law dispute instead of, say, allowing an 
agreement entered into at the time of the marriage to necessarily hold sway. Id. at 134. 
A potentially important recommendation is that the Arbitration Act should be 
amended to more concretely define what its requirement of a “fair and equal process” 
in arbitration means. Id. at 136. 
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religions) of origin,”94 and that, at heart, this existing system 
supported “inclusion which takes account of difference.”95  
Despite the Boyd Report’s basic endorsement of the 
status quo, the Government of Ontario nonetheless rejected the 
report’s recommendations, and indeed went so far as to make 
illegal any arbitration conducted according to any body of law 
other than the law of Ontario or of another Canadian 
  
 94 Id. at 90. Ayelet Shachar, another Canadian defender of the availability of 
some form of religious family law arbitration, has similarly stressed how religious law 
can “offer religious women a significant source of meaning and value,” Shachar, supra 
note 72, at 575, and as a result, can leave them feeling “obliged to have at least some 
aspects of their marriage and divorce regulated by religious principles and communal 
institutions,” id. at 604. Shachar has also argued the decision to ban religious 
arbitration is “not an ideal normative and jurisprudential solution,” given that the 
government’s  
“out of sight, out of mind” approach [to religious arbitration] will probably not 
be of much assistance to vulnerable group members in blocking communal 
pressures to resolve family disputes by turning to “their” group’s authorities 
which, now legally unrecognized, remain free of any regulatory oversight, 
whether ex ante or ex post. 
Id. at 604-05 (emphasis added). 
 95 Boyd Report, supra note 74, at 89. The report continued onward to 
distinguish its endorsement of “inclusion which takes account of difference” from 
“exclusion based on difference.” Id. (emphasis added). Again, however, this statement 
about arbitration as inclusion, instead of “separate but equal” exclusion, is a curious 
one, and appears to be motivated by the Boyd Report’s need to distinguish religious 
arbitration from Quebecois or First Nation legal separatism. The Boyd Report’s 
distancing moves in this respect are somewhat dubious, however, especially when they 
result in the statement that Jews’, Muslims’, and others’ resort to religious 
arbitration—instead of the state’s courts—ultimately amounts to a vigorous 
endorsement by religious communities of the state and its legal norms and institutions:  
By availing itself of provincial legislation that has been in place for over a 
decade, and that has been used by others, the Muslim community is drawing 
on the dominant legal culture to express itself. By using mainstream legal 
instruments minority communities openly engage in institutional dialogue. 
And by engaging in such dialogue, a community is also inviting the state into 
its affairs, particularly since the Arbitration Act, even in its present form, 
specifically sets out grounds for state intervention in the form of judicial 
oversight. Use of the Arbitration Act by minority communities can therefore 
be understood as a desire to engage with the broader community.  
Id. at 93.  
  In fact, opposition to and hostility towards the state’s system of courts and 
legal administration was relatively strong amongst some groups. For example, the 
Orthodox Jewish non-state court in Toronto (Beis Din) even opposed the Boyd Report 
committee’s relatively timid exploration of enhanced training for and regulation of 
religious arbitrators. See id. at 116-17. With respect to aboriginal peoples, the Boyd 
Report also acknowledged the submission of the Ontario Federation of Indian 
Friendship Centres, and its concerns that state regulation of arbitrators working on 
aboriginal family law matters would “tend to ignore the wisdom and experience so 
important within [our] communities and tie the process to the ‘white man’s system of 
justice,’ from which the community seeks relief.” Id. at 117 (paraphrasing the 
submission by the Ontario aboriginal group). 
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jurisdiction.96 This significant change in the law of arbitration 
was clearly the consequence of post-9/11 heightened anxiety 
concerning the loyalties and intentions of Canadian Muslims.97 
This dramatic post-Boyd Report turn of events 
notwithstanding, the Boyd Report’s discussions and 
conclusions, as well as the politics to which they are a response, 
are instructive and important in that they demonstrate that 
alternative visions of the relationship between dignity and 
family law pluralism exist and are potentially viable in the 
modern, secular state.98 
While a certain sort of family law pluralism has been 
shut down in Canada post-Boyd, the Islamophobia that 
underlies this move is not necessarily instructive of how 
dignity-minded individuals and governments should 
themselves come out on the question of family law pluralism. 
As the present situation in the United Kingdom suggests, other 
  
 96 See Family Arbitration Regulations (Arbitration Act), R.R.O./2007-134 
(Ont.). After this amendment, the Arbitration Act in Ontario now reads:  
Other third-party decision-making processes in family matters 
2.2 (1) When a decision about a matter described in clause (a) of the 
definition of “family arbitration” in section 1 is made by a third person in a 
process that is not conducted exclusively in accordance with the law of 
Ontario or of another Canadian jurisdiction, 
(a) the process is not a family arbitration; and 
(b) the decision is not a family arbitration award and has no legal effect. 
2006, c. 1, s. 1 (2).  
See Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 17 (1991), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/ 
html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_91a17_e.htm#BK3. 
 97 See Shachar, supra note 72, at 584; see also Haroon Siddiqui, Op-Ed., 
Sensationalism Shrouds the Debate on Sharia, TORONTO STAR, June 12, 2005, at A17. 
 98 They are also witness to the fact that religious persons are in the forefront 
of efforts to reform secularism and the hegemonic political embodiments, such as the 
state, with which secularism has often been associated. This is not to say that religious 
people in Canada were united in challenging the preeminence of the Canadian state’s 
role in regulating family relationships; they were not. In this respect, the Boyd Report 
was exemplary in its serious engagement with differences of opinion amongst Muslims 
(as well as amongst people of other religious faiths) about the proper goals of the 
community—including how best to obtain respect and dignity for this community. 
These differing views spanned the spectrum from a desire to establish a completely 
autonomous legal system for Canadian Muslims, see Boyd Report, supra note 74, at 88, 
to those of the Muslim Canadian Congress (MCC). The MCC is described as a private 
national organization that viewed itself as “progressive,” and which also claimed that 
the Arbitration Act “does not cover family law disputes” and “that if indeed the 
government takes the position . . . that the Arbitration Act can deal with these matters, 
then the . . . Act is unconstitutional . . . in that . . . [it b]reaches the unwritten 
constitutional norms enunciated by the Supreme [C]ourt of Canada . . . namely the rule 
of law, constitutionalism, federalism, and respect for minorities.” Id. at 29-30. 
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jurisdictions—equally afflicted by Islamophobia—might be on a 
different path. 
In early 2008, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan 
Williams, delivered a widely reported-upon and controversial 
talk in the United Kingdom on the topic of “Civil and Religious 
Law in England: A Religious Perspective.”99 Conceived as a 
general talk about how to respond to “the presence of 
communities [in the United Kingdom] which, while no less 
‘law-abiding’ than the rest of the population, relate to 
something other than the British legal system alone,”100 the 
Archbishop’s words resonated widely and loudly in a country 
still recovering from the 2005 attacks on its capital’s public 
transportation system, and the fears of a Muslim “fifth-column” 
that these attacks engendered. Journalistic reporting of the 
lecture focused on its comments concerning the place of Islamic 
law101 in an ostensibly secular102 legal system. However, the 
Archbishop himself emphasized that he was trying to speak 
generally “about the right of religious believers . . . to opt out of 
certain legal provisions—[for example,] the problems around 
Roman Catholic adoption agencies which emerged in relation to 
the Sexual Orientation Regulations [the previous spring].”103 
While the Archbishop’s widely-publicized speech was a 
response to recent events and concerns, debates concerning the 
limits to legal pluralism in the United Kingdom have actually 
been ongoing for some time. For example, in the 1970s, U.K. 
Muslim organizations organized to demand the formal 
recognition of a separate system of family law in the United 
  
 99 See Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Lecture at the Royal 
Courts of Justice, Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective (Feb. 7, 
2008), available at www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575.  
 100 Id. 
101See, e.g., Ruth Gledhill & Phillip Webster, Archbishop of Canterbury Argues for 
Islamic Law in Britain, TIMES, Feb. 8, 2008, available at http://www. 
timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article3328024.ece; Jonathan Petre & Andrew 
Porter, Adopt Sharia Law in Britain, Says the Archbishop of Canterbury Dr. Rowan 
Williams, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 8, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
news/uknews/1578017/Adopt-sharia-law-in-Britain-says-the-Archbishop-of-Canterbur 
y-Dr-Rowan-Williams.html; Sharia Law in UK is ‘Unavoidable’, BBC NEWS, Feb. 7, 
2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7232661.stm. 
 102 It is somewhat of a challenge to characterize the English legal system as 
“secular” when, as the Archbishop himself acknowledged, “the law of the Church of 
England is the law of the land.” Williams, supra note 99. The Archbishop went on to 
note, however, that the “daily operation” of that Church law “is in the hands of [non-
Church] authorities to whom considerable independence is granted.” Id. That being 
said, later in his talk, the Archbishop spoke admirably of what he characterized as a 
necessary “theology of law.” Id. 
 103 Id. 
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Kingdom for Muslims.104 While these efforts to garner the 
state’s official endorsement and enforcement of a separate 
family law system for Muslims in the United Kingdom were 
essentially unsuccessful, Muslim non-governmental 
organizations have developed a number of non-state Muslim 
legal institutions all over the United Kingdom in the past two 
decades.  
These institutions, or “shari‘a councils,” use procedures 
and practices informed by Islamic legal and moral norms to 
provide mediation and family law dispute resolution services 
for disputes arising in Muslim families. They identify 
themselves with names like “Muslim Marriage Guidance 
Council,” “Islamic Sharia Council,” and “Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal.”105 Most of these institutions see themselves as merely 
mediators in Muslim couples’ mundane problems and 
disagreements, offering non-binding advice as to Islamic family 
norms. Some of these institutions also hear and decide 
individuals’ petitions for religious divorce, and issue religious 
divorces.106 However, these declarations of divorce have no civil 
law effect, since only a state court can declare an officially-
married couple legally divorced.107 Only one institution, the 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, has taken the steps to officially 
register itself under the state’s Arbitration Act, so that it may 
  
 104 See generally Sebastian Poulter, The Claim to a Separate Islamic System of 
Personal Law for British Muslims, in ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 147 (Chibli Mallat & Jane 
Connors eds., 1990). 
 105 See generally Sameer Ahmed, Pluralism in British Islamic Reasoning: The 
Debate Over Official Recognition of Islamic Family Law in the United Kingdom 50-60 
(2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University) (on file with author); see 
also John R. Bowen, Private Arrangements: “Recognizing Sharia” in England, BOSTON 
REV., March/April 2009, at 15 (providing a general overview of the functioning of the 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal and Islamic Sharia Council). 
 106 For example, John Bowen reports that at the February 2008 monthly 
meeting of scholars associated with the Islamic Sharia Council that, with respect to the 
seven cases that these scholars heard as a group that month, the scholars either 
dissolved the marriage in question or deferred a decision and asked for more 
information. Incidentally, all seven cases were requests by women to divorce their 
husbands. See Bowen, supra note 105, at 16. For a general overview of these 
institutions’ functions, see Samia Bano, In Pursuit of Religious and Legal Diversity: A 
Response to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the ‘Sharia Debate’ in Britain, 10 
ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 283, 294-96 (2008). For a detailed scholarly study of one such 
institution, namely the Muslim Law (Shariah) Council, based in West London, see 
generally SHAH-KAZEMI, supra note 60. 
 107 See Bowen, supra note 105, at 16; see also Lucy Carroll, Muslim Women 
and ‘Islamic Divorce’ in England, 17 J. MUSLIM MINORITY AFF. 97 (1997), available at 
http://www.wluml.org/node/304. 
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resolve civil (including intra-family) disputes108 in a legally 
binding manner, using the tools of state-defined arbitration. 
As in Canada,109 Muslim opinion in the United Kingdom 
as to the desirability of establishing a distinct set of legal 
institutions for Muslims is not univocal; there are both Muslim 
supporters and Muslim detractors of efforts to establish non-
state Muslim legal institutions. For example, as in Canada, 
some Muslims see the effort to establish officially-recognized 
and supported Islamic law in the United Kingdom as no 
different than—and as necessary as—the state’s recognition of 
sub-national territorial-cum-community laws. For example, one 
Muslim commentator has remarked that “[T]his country has 
already two laws—one law of inheritance applies to England 
and Wales and one law of inheritance applies to Scotland. How 
are these two laws able to coexist peacefully without disrupting 
the legal system of this country? Similarly, Islamic family law 
can coexist with this law without disrupting the whole legal 
structure.”110 
Other Muslims, while supporting non-state Muslim 
legal institutions (such as shari‘a councils), believe that the 
effects on the Muslim community that could result from the 
state establishing or officially-recognizing Islamic legal 
institutions might be extremely detrimental. These possible 
effects include a potential exacerbation of intra-community 
communal tensions as groups vie with each other for the state’s 
patronage, or a corruption in the content of Islamic law as state 
concerns and priorities come to infiltrate previously 
autonomous religio-legal discussions.111 Other Muslims worry 
explicitly about any sort of Muslim separateness, with these 
worries echoing those found in the U.S. about “separate but 
equal” legal regimes. For example, one commentator has 
argued that “Muslims should try to integrate themselves into 
society. . . . A separate system would create a stigma and lead 
people to discriminate against Muslims.”112 Finally, 
  
 108 Not all of these arbitration matters involve intra-family civil disputes. The 
website of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal reports that they also handle “Commercial 
and Debt Disputes” and “Mosque Disputes.” See Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, 
http://www.matribunal.com/cases.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 109 See supra note 98. 
 110 Syed Aziz Pasha, Union of Muslim Org., Address in London (Aug. 22, 
2004), in Ahmed at 79. 
 111 See id. at 83-84. 
 112 Id. at 85 (emphasis added); see also Samia Bano’s worry about the 
development of a “new normative discourse, which stigmatises Muslims as the 
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commentators have expressed worry that the welfare of 
Muslim women can be compromised by the “privatization” of 
family law enforcement and efforts to increasingly locate that 
enforcement in non-state, community-premised—and 
potentially patriarchal—bodies and organizations.113 
This diversity of opinions being the case, there is 
evidence suggesting that the number of Muslims using the 
services of these non-state Muslim institutions might very well 
be on a steady rise.114 If that is actually the case, this would not 
be surprising in light of the finding by one recent poll of (500) 
British Muslims “that a clear majority [of those polled] want 
Islamic law introduced into this country in civil cases relating 
to their own community. Some 61% wanted Islamic courts—
operating on shari‘a principles—‘so long as the penalties did 
not contravene British law.’”115 Another recent study suggests 
that 37% of British Muslims aged 16-24 “would prefer to live 
under sharia law [as opposed to British law],” which is 
significantly higher than the 17% of British Muslims 55-years-
old and older who would prefer the same.116  
  
‘Other’—in conflict with, incompatible with and, most importantly, disloyal to the 
state.” Bano, supra note 106, at 287. Bano goes on to argue that “Muslim engagement 
with the law and sharia must be read within the broader social and political context in 
which [Muslims] operate [and] must . . . not fall in to the traps of cultural essentialism 
and homogeneity that reproduce the binaries that [one] seeks to dismantle and 
displace.” Id. 
 113 See, e.g., Bano, supra note 106, at 300-01. Bano is critical of ongoing 
discussions concerning shari‘a councils which do not take into account the experiences 
and views of “Muslim women, who are the primary users of [shari’a councils].” Id. at 
288. While Bano’s research reports a variety of views amongst Muslim women with 
respect to shari‘a councils—with some women enthusiastically supporting these 
councils and other women far more skeptical—Bano herself is clearly troubled by 
efforts to enhance the powers and authority of shari‘a councils. See id. at 309 (noting 
that Bano is writing “with the conviction that Muslim women remain extremely 
cautious of initiatives to accommodate sharia into English law”); see also SHAH-
KAZEMI, supra note 60, at 70 for her research findings that “formal recognition of the 
shari’a system of laws in Britain would be problematic, and such recognition is not 
sought by . . . the majority of Muslim community organisations.” 
 114 The Islamic Sharia Council, one major such non-state Muslim legal 
institution, reports that from 1982-1995, 1500 cases were filed with it. From 1996-
2009, however, at least 5500 cases were filed. Islamic Sharia Council, Islamic Sharia 
Council—About Us, http://www.islamic-sharia.org/about-us/about-us-9.html (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2010). 
 115 See Alan Travis & Madeleine Bunting, British Muslims want Islamic law 
and prayers at work, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 30, 2004, available at http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/uk/2004/nov/30/immigrationpolicy. 
 116 See MUNIRA MIRZA, ABI SENTHIKUMARAN & ZEIN JA’FAR, LIVING APART 
TOGETHER: BRITISH MUSLIMS AND THE PARADOX OF MULTICULTURALISM 5 (2007), cited 
in Samia Bano, Islamic Family Arbitration, Justice and Human Rights in Britain, 
LAW, SOCIAL JUSTICE & GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (2007), available at http://www.go. 
warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2007_1/bano. In this piece by Samia Bano, Bano is critical of the 
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Clearly, people’s responses to survey questions are more 
complicated and nuanced than any crude statistic can capture. 
However, these numbers in support of a separate legal system 
for a U.K. minority are nonetheless surprisingly robust, 
especially in light of the usual liberal claims that “separate” is 
necessarily “unequal.” If that liberal claim is right, it appears 
that substantial numbers of British Muslims want to be 
stigmatized as unequal. While that is a possibility, what 
appears more probable is that substantial numbers of Muslims 
in the United Kingdom contest majority practices and values,117 
including Islamophobia.118 Other Muslims worry less about 
majority ill-will than they do about majority (cultural) 
incompetence.119 
While the future direction of the debate over official 
recognition (in some manner) of Islamic (family) law in the 
United Kingdom is entirely unpredictable, the fact that the 
head of the Church of England is making speeches speaking 
favorably of (some) Islamic legal institutions, and advocating 
more legal pluralism, suggests that monumental change is 
afoot. Whatever the outcome(s) of this debate, its existence, 
similar to the Ontario debate, demonstrates that alternative 
visions of the relationship between dignity and family law 
pluralism exist and are viable in the modern, secular state. 
In both Canada and the United Kingdom, then, 
members of religious minorities have recently deployed 
arguments relating to dignity to argue against the universal 
application of majority-defined state family law norms. In 
Canada, these arguments ultimately proved unsuccessful in 
the face of a dignity-defying Islamophobia, and religious family 
  
survey methodology used by Mirza, Senthikumaran & Ja’far and contests the accuracy 
of their findings. See id. 
 117 Speaking of Muslims in England, Ihsan Yilmaz writes that “[m]ost . . . see 
Western society as aimless and rootless, marred by increasing vandalism, crime, 
juvenile delinquency, the collapse of marriages, growing numbers of illegitimate 
children, and near constant stress and anxiety. They view Islam as the positive 
alternative.” Ihsan Yilmaz, Muslim Alternative Dispute Resolution and Neo-Ijtihad in 
England, 2 ALTERNATIVES: TURKISH J. OF INT’L REL. 121-22 (2003). 
 118 Yilmaz, supra note 117, notes the disparity in how English Jews and Sikhs 
are protected under the Race Relations Act, but not Muslims. “As a result, there has 
been widespread alienation from the state among [Muslims].” Id. at 122. 
 119 See SHAH-KAZEMI, supra note 60, at 53-55, 71-77 for examples and 
discussion of incompetence on the behalf of British (non-Muslim) lawyers giving advice 
to their Muslim clients on both English and Islamic law. In one instance, one of these 
lawyers drew up a talaqnama for his female client, in which he had his client—a 
woman—attempt to divorce her husband by pronouncing “I TALAK YOU” thrice. See 
id. at 54-55. 
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law arbitration in one leading province of that country 
(Ontario) has been severely curtailed. Both Jews and 
Muslims—the two minorities who had been the most vocal in 
trying to protect the availability of religiously-informed non-
state family law arbitration for their communities—have been 
forced to abide by the state’s legislated family law rules.120 In 
the United Kingdom, the debate is gaining momentum. 
Following the important and widely-discussed speech by the 
Archbishop of Canterbury on legal pluralism and dignity, the 
issue of non-state arbitration for religious minorities’ family 
law issues is very much on the national radar, as is the 
question how the dignity of religious minorities can be 
enhanced by the existence of increased family law pluralism. In 
short, in both Canada and the United Kingdom, a positive 
relationship between dignity and legal pluralism has been 
discussed and made possible; any assumption of dissonance 
and incoherence between these two ideas is itself incoherent in 
these non-American contexts. 
C. Personal Law, “Separate But Equal” Family Laws, and 
Minority Rights 
The debates in Canada and the United Kingdom 
concerning family law pluralism are, in part, a debate about 
“private ordering,” or the ability of people to “privately” 
construct alternatives to the state’s monolithic family law 
rules, norms, and assumptions. However, another model of 
family law pluralism—namely, that of “personal law”—is also 
widely practiced and debated around the globe. In contrast to 
the private ordering model, this form of family law pluralism is 
one where the state itself is explicitly involved in defining 
and/or enforcing121 different family laws for different 
communities. 
As a method of legislating and administering laws, 
personal law has a long history, dating back at least to the time 
of the Romans.122 However, personal law is still found all over 
  
 120 See supra note 96. 
 121 States that have personal law systems will differ to the extent they will 
allow communities to legislate, administer, and otherwise enforce their particular 
personal laws. There is no single model of a personal law system, though there are 
commonalities between such systems. For a comparison of two widely-studied personal 
law systems, see Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Personal Law and Human 
Rights in India and Israel, 34 ISR. L. REV. 101, 115 (2000). 
 122 See FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
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the modern world. While often, but not always, the product of 
European colonial rule, this kind of (family) law system has 
been retained in many post-colonial states, including Israel, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, and India.123 
At a very general level, a personal law system is a legal 
system in which laws or legal norms bind “different” people 
differently, sorting people into various legal regimes depending 
on the “type of person” involved.124 The aspects of personhood 
that most contemporary personal law systems use to 
distinguish between people are those relating to religion and 
ethnicity.125  
As indicated, India is one prominent country where the 
administration of family law is organized around a personal 
law model. India’s personal law system is one that is premised 
on people’s religiously communal identifications.126 When people 
refer to India’s personal law system, then, they mean the 
system of Indian family law whereby Hindus, Muslims, 
Christians, and others are governed by different family law 
codes, practices, and norms.127 In this system of family law, one 
finds the “Hindu Marriage Act” (which also governs divorces 
  
RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION OF STATUTES: A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND 
THE LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME 58-59 (William 
Guthrie trans., Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1880). 
 123 See generally Redding, supra note 70. 
 124 See generally id. The factors that are important to personhood may differ 
from society to society. As a result, any given personal law system might look unlike 
any other such system. However, what characterizes all personal law systems is that 
the law which applies to one in such systems depends on the “kind of person” one is, 
instead of on one’s generic membership in an undifferentiated polity. See generally id. 
  The terms “personhood” and “type of persons” are used here to emphasize 
that not every law that distinguishes between persons is a personal law, but only those 
laws that distinguish between socially and politically relevant “types” of people. This, 
obviously, will differ from society to society. For example, “high-caste” and “low-caste” 
people are relevant types of people in India, in a way that they are not for the vast 
majority of Americans. Race rather than caste, in this respect, is more central to the 
American discussion. See generally id. 
 125 See generally id. That being said, personal law is not just law that 
distinguishes between people with different kinds of communal or kinship ties (religion 
and ethnicity being two prime examples of such ties). The term “personal law” has, in 
fact, not been strictly limited (either historically or contemporarily) in this way. See, 
e.g., RAMANI MUTTETUWEGAMA, PARALLEL SYSTEMS OF PERSONAL LAWS IN SRI LANKA 
3-5 (1997) (discussing the quasi-territorial, quasi-ethnic aspects of Sri Lankan personal 
law). 
 126 Galantar & Krishnan, supra note 121, at 103. 
 127 Id. at 109. Presently in India, the central government (and, to a much 
lesser degree, state governments) legislates on different religious communities’ 
personal laws. Furthermore, there is a relatively unified, hierarchically-organized 
national judiciary in India that enforces and administers this legislation, as well as the 
large amount of uncodified religious personal law that is found in judicial precedents. 
Id. at 109. 
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between Hindu marital parties), and also the “Indian Christian 
Marriage Act.”128 Furthermore, the “Indian Divorce Act” governs 
Christian divorces, while the “Dissolution of Muslim Marriages 
Act” governs some kinds of Muslim divorces.129 There are also 
many other examples of these kinds of statutes in India, as 
well as a large body of religion-specific, judicially-developed 
common law that relates to the family.130 
While the motivations behind personal law systems are 
surely complex and dynamic over the course of history,131 today 
they are in very large part “intended to help ethnic groups and 
religious minorities express their cultural particularity and 
pride without it hampering their success in the economic and 
political institutions of the dominant society.”132 Looking at 
  
 128 Id. at 109 n.42. 
 129 The Indian Divorce Act, No. 4 of 1869, India Code, amended by The Indian 
Divorce (Amendment) Bill, Act No. 51 of 2001, India Code, available at http://indiacode. 
nic.in/ (search “search Indiacode: Short Title” for “The Indian Divorce Act”; then follow 
“Download full act” hyperlink under search results); The Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages Act, No. 8 of 1939, India Code, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/ (search 
“search Indiacode: Short Title” for “The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act”; then 
follow “Download full act” hyperlink under search results). 
 130 Galantar & Krishnan, supra note 121, at 109. There is also family law (for 
example, the recently-enacted “Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act of 
2005”) which is not administered along communitarian lines. See The Protection of 
Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, India Code, available at http:// 
indiacode.nic.in/ (indicating that this Act is applicable to “any woman”). 
 131 India’s present personal law system can be traced back at least to the 1772 
decision by Warren Hastings, the British viceroy for India at the time, to “in all Suits 
regarding Marriage, Inheritance, Cast, and other religious Usages or Institutions, 
[apply] the Laws of the Koran with respect to [Muslims], and those of the Shaster with 
respect to [Hindus].” A Plan for the Administration of Justice (1772); see also WILLIAM 
H. MORLEY, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN BRITISH INDIA; ITS PAST HISTORY 
AND PRESENT STATE: COMPRISING AN ACCOUNT OF THE LAWS PECULIAR TO INDIA 
177, 177-78 (1858). For a discussion of this British policy, see Galanter & Krishnan, 
supra note 121, at 106; see also M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS 60 (1975). 
  While one might have expected otherwise from such an ambitious 
announcement, ultimately Hastings’ decision was only fully implemented in the areas 
of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and adoption law, as well as in the management of 
religious endowments. After independence, and after much debate, the post-colonial 
Indian state decided to continue this basic split between universally oriented criminal 
law and personally oriented family law.  
 132 WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
MINORITY RIGHTS 31 (1995). Rina Verma Williams has characterized the post-colonial 
retention of personal law systems as “a way to avert ethnic unrest and preserve 
cultural autonomy in multiethnic societies.” RINA VERMA WILLIAMS, POSTCOLONIAL 
POLITICS AND PERSONAL LAWS: COLONIAL LEGAL LEGACIES AND THE INDIAN STATE 7 
(2006). Finally, India’s post-Independence leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, himself remarked 
that “we do not dare touch the Moslems [with respect to their personal law] because 
they are a minority and we do not wish the Hindu majority to do it. These are personal 
laws and so they will remain for the Moslems, unless they want to change them.” See 
TIBOR MENDE, CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. NEHRU 57 (1956), cited in WILLIAMS, supra, 
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personal law systems in India and elsewhere, what is 
interesting to note is that “second class” citizens—for example, 
Muslims in the case of Hindu-majority India—often oppose any 
effort to amalgamate them into a common, unitary family law 
system.133 
Perhaps the best example of this kind of opposition to 
majoritarian absorption, in the Indian context at least, is a 
still-potent controversy which dates from the mid-1980s. This 
controversy, widely known as “the Shah Bano crisis,” resulted 
from a decision handed down by the Indian Supreme Court in 
the case of Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum.134 The 
question presented was whether the Indian Code of Criminal 
Procedure’s requirement that a man indefinitely financially 
maintain his ex-wife after a divorce if she is “unable to 
maintain herself”135 was applicable to Muslim men, who 
arguably have more limited responsibilities136 toward their ex-
wives under classical Islamic family law. Ultimately, the 
Indian Supreme Court determined that 1) the Code of Criminal 
Procedure’s requirements superseded any contradictory 
Muslim personal law rules and requirements,137 and 2) nothing 
in Muslim personal law forbade indefinite maintenance to a 
divorced wife “who is unable to maintain herself.”138 
  
at 116. But see MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 
AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 111 (1996) (arguing that colonial-era legal 
pluralism “was more an expression of power relations in a colonial society than a 
recognition and tolerance of any multicultural diversity”). 
 133 It is important to note here that at India’s independence, conservative 
Hindu organizations also opposed the newly independent state’s (ultimately successful) 
attempts to reformulate Hindu personal law, using arguments about the 
inappropriateness of (secular) state “interference” in religious personal laws. See 
WILLIAMS, supra note 132, at 19, 104-14. Later, this particular brand of Hindu politics 
radically changed, such that while “[i]n the 1980s, religious identity for the Muslim 
community became virtually coterminous with the preservation of their personal law[, 
f]or some Hindus, . . . Indian national identity became virtually coterminous with 
forcing the Muslim community to give up their personal law.” Id. at 127. 
 134 (1985) 3 S.C.R. 844. 
 135 INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. § 125(1)(a). 
 136 Under most classical interpretations of Islamic divorce law, it is generally 
the rule that a man is required to financially maintain his (ex-)wife up until the time 
she has, post-divorce, menstruated three times. See DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, 
MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 182-84, 280-82 (3d ed. 1998). 
 137 Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 844, 854-56. 
 138 Id. at 859-62. Arguably, the first holding was sufficient to have settled the 
case, and it was gratuitous and provocative for the Indian Supreme Court to have 
interpreted the Muslim community’s personal law. This seems especially the case given 
that other portions of the court’s opinion took a patronizing tone in regards to the 
content of such personal law. The lead paragraph in this opinion, in fact, included the 
following remarks: “it is alleged that the fatal point in Islam is the degradation of 
woman. To the Prophet is ascribed the statement, hopefully wrongly, that Woman was 
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The opinion ignited large protests by conservative 
Muslims across India (and smaller counter-protests by a 
number of dissident Muslim women and their allies).139 
Eventually, then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his 
government acquiesced to conservative Muslim demands to 
pass a law to eliminate Muslim (and only Muslim) women’s 
rights to petition for and receive indefinite post-divorce 
maintenance from their ex-husbands.140 While the legal effect of 
this relatively recent addition to India’s personal law system 
has been whittled back over time, the law still remains on the 
books, and Muslim political and social organizations would 
most likely intensely resist its removal.141 
This dispute over Muslim personal law is both cause 
and symptom of a larger social and political debate about the 
secular credentials of a post-colonial Indian state (as opposed to 
the “Islamic” post-colonial Pakistani state). There is no 
foreseeable end to this debate, but neither is there any 
foreseeable end to the enforcement of personal law. Amongst 
India’s religious minorities, it is common to find antagonism to 
the idea that everyone in India should be bound to one uniform 
civil (family law) code. While religious feminists are working 
  
made from a crooked rib, and if you try to bend it straight, it will break; therefore treat 
your wives kindly.” Id. at 849-50 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 139 See Kirti Singh, The Constitution and Muslim Personal Law, in FORGING 
IDENTITIES: GENDER, COMMUNITIES, AND THE STATE 96, 101-03 (Zoya Hasan ed., 1994); 
WILLIAMS, supra note 132, at 145 (documenting smaller size of counter-protests by 
progressive Muslims). 
 140 See The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, No. 25 of 
1986, available at http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=198625. In response to this 
legislation, cries of “appeasement” were effectively raised by Hindu nationalist 
quarters, which eventually helped lead to the national electoral successes of the Hindu-
nationalist BJP political party. These successes, in turn, led to a severe polarization in 
Hindu-Muslim relations in India, a corresponding increase in violence between the two 
communities, and the drawing of new and sharper boundaries between the two 
communities. These communal problems, and the challenges they present for 
legislation and judicial decision-making in the area of personal law, persist today. See 
Redding, supra note 70, at 967-68. 
 141 For the results of different surveys of Muslim public opinion on the issue of 
personal law reform, see WILLIAMS, supra note 132, at 58. For example, a 1996 survey 
found that 67% of Muslims (and over 50% of Christians) favored the retention of India’s 
personal law system, while only 42% of Hindus favored keeping this system. Id. 
Another 1995 survey of 200 Muslim women found that while 62% of respondents 
thought that Muslim personal law in India should be reformed in at least one aspect or 
another, only 14% would go so far as to eradicate the Indian method of organizing 
family law along a personal law model itself. See Sabeeha Bano, Muslim Women’s 
Voices, 47 ECON. & POL. WKLY 2981, 2982 (1995). All of these results should be 
appropriately contextualized and qualified by noting both the enormous size of India’s 
Muslim population—approximately 150 million—and the large number of class, caste, 
regional, and sectarian differences which internally differentiate this population. 
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for more women-friendly versions of personal law, such a 
project has goals different than delegating family law solely to 
patriarchal others, whether those “others” be religiously- or 
secularly-spirited.142 The result is that the Indian constitution’s 
declaration that India is a “sovereign, socialist, secular, 
democratic republic”143 is read as including a commitment to 
enforcing “separate but equal” family law.144 
Ultimately, as this section’s (brief) discussion of India’s 
personal law system suggests, many people in India view 
family law pluralism as not only co-existing with the dignity of 
  
 142 For results of a poll of Muslim women which are consistent with this 
observation, see, for example, supra note 141. More generally, Madhavi Sunder has 
noted how  
[i]ndividuals in the modern world [are] increasingly demand[ing] change 
within their religious communities in order to bring their faith in line with 
democratic norms and practices. Call this the New Enlightenment: Today, 
individuals [are] seek[ing] reason, equality, and liberty not just in the public 
sphere, but also in the private spheres of religion, culture, and family. 
Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2003) (emphasis added). 
Finally, Kumkum Sangiri has remarked on the (perhaps) less-than-obvious patriarchal 
objectives of India’s ostensibly liberatory/secular state by noting that “[b]eneath the 
opposition between a state-imposed uniform civil code and personal laws that are 
sought to be reformed from ‘within’ a community . . . lies an unresolved but entirely 
patriarchal concern: who will control and regulate women . . . .” Kumkum Sangari, 
Politics of Diversity: Religious Communities and Multiple Patriarchies, ECON. & POL. 
WKLY. 3287, 3296 (1995). 
 143 INDIA CONST. Preamble (emphasis added). The Constitution of India also 
includes a number of equality provisions. See, e.g., INDIA CONST. art. 14 (equality 
before law), art. 15 (sex equality), art. 16 (equality of opportunity in public 
employment), art. 17 (abolition of untouchability). 
  Many Indian feminists (and Hindu nationalists) have argued that the 
maintenance of different family laws for persons of different religious faiths is 
inconsistent with the Constitution (and its guarantees of religious and sexual equality). 
See generally FLAVIA AGNES, LAW AND GENDER INEQUALITY: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS IN INDIA 192-202 (2000). However, many members of minority religious faiths 
have vociferously disagreed, basing their arguments on Article 26 of the Constitution, 
amongst other arguments. See generally id. at 100-23, 192-202. Article 26 guarantees 
that “[s]ubject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or 
any section thereof shall have the right . . . to manage its own affairs in matters of 
religion.” INDIA CONST. art. 26. 
  Both sides of this dispute utilize Article 44’s judicially-unenforceable plea 
for a “uniform civil code” in support of their constitutional and legal positions. See 
AGNES at 193. Article 44, part of the Constitution’s judicially-unenforceable “Directive 
Principles of State Policy,” reads as follows: “The State shall endeavour to secure for 
the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.” INDIA CONST. art. 
44. 
 144 Members of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party, 
would likely disagree. However, on this point, even these members would likely 
concede that their position that secularism is threatened by allowing minorities to be 
kept “separate and not equal” is a position swimming against the tide of history and 
practice. See WILLIAMS, supra note 132, at 171-72 (quoting a BJP publication and its 
use of “separate and not equal” phraseology). 
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minorities, but actually as somewhat of a pre-requisite for that 
dignity. Of course, there are intense disagreements among 
different members of any given minority group about the 
proper content of the family law that applies to the group.145 
Furthermore, these disagreements are often resolved at the 
expense of minority women. These (fortunate) debates and 
(unfortunate) abuses aside, the legal and political situation in 
many personal law systems nonetheless presents a very 
different take on the relationship between dignity and family 
law pluralism than that found in the California and 
Connecticut supreme courts’ recent opinions. In these systems 
with communally-premised personal law systems, both refuge 
and dignity are found outside of the confines of majoritarian 
marriage and family law. 
D. Conclusion 
The California and Connecticut supreme courts viewed 
gay and lesbian dignity as inextricably bound up in formal 
equality and access to the (heterosexual) institution of 
majoritarian marriage. This account of dignity is not 
necessarily wrong,146 but as the discussion in this Part (and 
Part I) has suggested, this account involves more assertion 
than analysis, and ignores the ways in which numerous people 
around the globe have felt that something other than mimicry 
of the majority creates a feeling of dignity in their lives. In this 
respect, religious people (amongst others) both inside and 
outside of the United States have attempted to exert agency 
over—and, hence, experience dignity with respect to—their 
family law.147 In other words, these people have demonstrated 
how dignity inheres in being active authors of their law and, in 
this way, exercising both authority over and responsibility for 
this law.148 
  
 145 One might note that, at the very least, this intra-community disagreement 
is on full display in India, whereas legal and judicial discussions concerning same-sex 
marriage in the United States obscure and ignore debate within the gay and lesbian 
community about the desirability of marriage.  
 146 See discussion supra note 68. 
 147 For a more detailed discussion of how I am understanding and using the 
term “agency” in this Article, see infra Part III. 
 148 This is the case even when (religious) people have sought particularized 
religious exceptions from otherwise generally-applicable law, as opposed to 
affirmatively drafting altogether-alternative legislation containing independently-
authored norms. In this respect, arbitration of family law matters often involves both 
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The family law terrain in Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and India has been, and remains, contested. While great 
uncertainty exists in how these (and many other) states will 
ultimately resolve the competing interests and pressures 
present in these contemporary family law debates, what seems 
far more certain is that legal pluralism with respect to the 
state’s regulation of the family will persist (and perhaps 
predominate) as a mode of contemporary governance. 
Majorities’ intolerance of minorities threatens this pluralism, 
but this intolerance is also one of the major antecedents to the 
felt need for pluralism. 
“Separate but equal” family law is thus here to stay, and 
arguments relating to minority rights, religious liberty, and 
human dignity will continue to support this kind of 
administration of family law, and also to put pressure on it. 
Ultimately, then, dignity is a much more complicated, 
contested, and dynamic concept than contemporary U.S. same-
sex marriage advocates (including supportive courts) appear 
willing to acknowledge. Moreover, protecting gay and lesbian 
dignity may very well require something different than 
amalgamating gays and lesbians into a heterosexually-
dominated majoritarian marriage regime, in which gays and 
lesbians will continually be democratically outmatched with 
respect to this regime’s substantive content and norms. The 
next Part explores what a different approach to gay and lesbian 
dignity in the United States might look like. 
III. SPECIAL RIGHTS, DIGNITY, AND THE FUTURE OF GAY AND 
LESBIAN RELATIONSHIP-RECOGNITION 
Marriage is not the same thing as love. For their part, heterosexuals 
have shown us what marriage is worth and how long it lasts. . . . 
Rather than accept the narrowness under which heterosexuals 
themselves chafe, why not invite them to share in what we 
[homosexuals] know about the multiples ways in which relationships 
can form? If we come to heterosexuals and their institution, we 
valorize the mechanism of our oppression. Let them come to us.149 
—Steven K. Homer (1994) 
  
exception from otherwise generally-applicable family law and the affirmative 
legislation of law (both procedural and substantive) to govern the issues at hand. 
 149 Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 504, 530 
(1994). 
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At first I was calling it getting “civilized,” but that wasn’t going over 
very well. “Getting unionized,” that’s what the TV reporters are 
saying. Others are saying “united.”150 
—Jon Pominville 
Middlebury, VT Town Clerk (2000) 
Buried in the California Supreme Court’s decision in In 
re Marriage Cases was the following observation by the court 
about the need for same-sex couples to be able to “marry,” as 
opposed to enter into a (equally privileged) “domestic 
partnership”:  
Because the constitutional right of privacy ordinarily would protect 
an individual from having to disclose his or her sexual orientation 
under circumstances in which that information is irrelevant, the 
existence of two separate family designations—one available only to 
opposite-sex couples and the other to same-sex couples—impinges 
upon this privacy interest, and may expose gay individuals to 
detrimental treatment by those who continue to harbor prejudices 
that have been rejected by California society at large.151 
While playing a minor part in its overall decision, the court’s 
invocation of the proverbial “closet” to justify same-sex 
marriage rights is instructive more generally about some of the 
real injuries to gay and lesbian dignity, as well as other gay 
and lesbian interests, that the push for same-sex marriage is 
inflicting. And indeed, in addition to giving the closet a new 
door (and lock), gay and lesbian activists’ pursuit of same-sex 
marriage rights has resulted in a number of other curious 
tactics. These include 1) conveying to fellow (sexual) minorities 
that they are not welcome to join the struggle for gay and 
lesbian civil rights,152 2) re-validating sexual shame and 
  
 150 Carol Ness, Couples Flock to Vermont, Only Legal Place to Get Hitched, 
S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 7, 2000, at A1 (quoting Jon Pominville, a town clerk in 
Middlebury, Vermont, on public confusion over how to refer to people getting a 
Vermont civil union). 
 151 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 446 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 152 I am thinking here of how some same-sex marriage advocates have 
opposed the extension of rights that they are seeking to those wishing to enter 
polygamous marriages. For a sampling of academic literature that advocates this two-
track approach to the right to marry, see, for example, Hema Chatlani, In Defense of 
Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Lead Us Down A Slippery Slope Toward 
the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 101 (2006) (arguing that the 
legalization of polygamous marriage would pose problems for social order and gender 
equality that same-sex marriage does not); Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy and Same-Sex 
Marriage: Allies or Adversaries Within the Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 14 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559 (2008) (arguing that both polygamists and gays and lesbians 
have faced persecution in the U.S. but nonetheless suggesting, mostly for tactical 
 
834 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:3 
mockery as legitimate weapons in American political 
discourse,153 and 3) running rough-shod over (intimate) logic 
and experience.154 
Some of these tactics have surely been born out of 
frustration, while others are the result of nakedly tactical 
considerations. With respect to tactical decisions about who to 
include in the movement, and who to exclude, given the 
difficult (if not dangerous) social climate in the United States 
with respect to gay and lesbian issues, it is not surprising that 
gay and lesbian activism has tried to weave a path of least 
resistance for itself, distancing itself publicly from politically 
unpopular allies in an attempt to mimic the majority. 
  
reasons, that same-sex marriage activists distance themselves from pro-polygamy 
activists); Elizabeth Larcano, A “Pink” Herring: The Prospect of Polygamy Following 
the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2006) (arguing 
that there are a large number of differences both between polygamous and same-sex 
unions, and between polygamist and gay and lesbian persons); Maura I. Strassberg, 
Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 
N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1617 (1997) (arguing that polygamous marriages are patriarchal 
while same-sex marriages are not). 
 153 I am thinking here of the gay and lesbian protests which erupted around 
the country in late 2008 in the wake of the passage of Proposition 8 in California. See, 
e.g., Gay-Marriage Rally Held at NYC Mormon Temple, Associated Press, Nov. 12, 
2008, available at http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/gay-marriage-rally-held-at-
nyc-mormon-temple-1.885717?qr=1; Prop 8 Protest in New York City, TOWLEROAD, 
Nov. 9, 2008, available at http://www.towleroad.com/2008/11/prop-8-protes-1.html; 
Chris Rovzar, Gays Turn Anger, Snappy Sarcasm Toward Mormon Church, DAILY 
INTEL, Nov. 13, 2008, available at http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2008/11/gays_turn_ 
anger_snappy_sarcasm.html. A constant refrain at these protests involved the willful 
distortion and mocking disrespect of religious (and, most notably, Mormon) beliefs and 
practices. Some signs at these protests contained the following slogans and statements: 
“You want three wives, I want one husband,” “I Don’t Need 5 Wives Just 1 Husband,” 
and “Keep Your Magic Undies Off My Civil Rights.” For photos of signs at Proposition 8 
protests outside of Mormon temple and elsewhere, see http://www.nbclosangeles.com/ 
news/local/Prop_8_Protestors_March_LA_Streets.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2010), 
http://lh6.ggpht.com/_780ZZpC_ZNU/SRgdL1yCBwI/AAAAAAAAAjs/nIvwa8j4u4w/s40
0/Not5WivesCropx390.jpg (last visited Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.utne.com/uploaded 
Images/utne/blogs/Spirituality/Prop8protest.jpg (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). For a 
statement from the Mormon religion’s leadership firmly disavowing polygamy, see The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Polygamy: Latter-day Saints and the 
Practice of Plural Marriage, available at http://www.newsroom.lds.org/ldsnewsroom/ 
eng/background-information/polygamy-latter-day-saints-and-the-practice-of-plural-
marriage (last visited Feb. 11, 2010). 
 154 For example, arguing for same-sex marriage rights, one attorney has 
remarked: “I used to say, ‘Why do we want to get married? It doesn’t work for straight 
people . . . .’ But now I say we should care: They have the privilege of divorce and we 
don’t. We’re left out there to twirl around in pain.” Kirk Johnson, Gay Divorce: Few 
Markers in This Realm, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994 (quoting Margaret M. Cassella). 
While for some people there might be something glamorous, and hence desirable, about 
the figure of the divorcée, I believe it is rather doubtful to argue that gays and lesbians 
need marriage because they want divorce. This would seem to be a case of putting the 
cart before the horse. 
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Nonetheless, such political and legal strategies are 
compromising gay and lesbian dignity, as are strategies that 
seek alignment with institutions that have been and will 
remain captive to majoritarian interests, i.e. institutions where 
gays and lesbians will be unable to exercise much agency with 
respect to laws and policies that will directly affect gay and 
lesbian lives and well-being. Marriage is one such majoritarian 
institution.  
This Part aims to sketch a vision for gay and lesbian 
dignity that is different than the coercive one articulated by the 
California and Connecticut supreme courts, and also by leading 
gay and lesbian advocacy organizations which are attempting 
to legalize same-sex marriage. This alternative, and arguably 
more robust, vision of gay and lesbian dignity is one which is 
informed by the comparative experience discussed in Part II. It 
is also one that is informed by a close reading (below) of a 
desire expressed by many ordinary gays and lesbians post-
Proposition 8, namely a desire for more agency with respect to 
laws and policies affecting gay and lesbian lives. Ultimately, 
the vision of dignity sketched here is one which cooperates 
neither with any homophobic desire to socially erase gay and 
lesbian existence, nor homophobic efforts to force gays and 
lesbians to conform with heterosexually-authored codes of 
behavior. 
This Part will repeatedly invoke the idea of “agency,” so 
a few words of how this term is being used are in order. What 
constitutes agency is, obviously, a difficult question, which 
requires more discussion than space here permits. Briefly, 
however, this Part understands the existence of (individual or 
collective) “agency” to mean the ability of persons to engage in 
a complicated “calculus of action”155 directed toward their “self-
realization/self-fulfillment.”156 However, this Part does not 
employ the term as a synonym for (personal or communal) 
“autonomy,” or any simplistic notion of (personal or communal) 
“sovereignty.” Similarly, this Part does not mean to equate 
“agency” with simplistic notions of “freedom” or “choice” or 
otherwise suggest that agency implies a socially and culturally 
unfettered ability to pick and choose with abandon what one 
desires in life. Such freedom (of choice) does not exist in this 
  
 155 See PERVEEZ MODY, THE INTIMATE STATE: LOVE-MARRIAGE AND THE LAW 
IN DELHI 193 (2008).  
 156 SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND THE 
FEMINIST SUBJECT 13 (2005). 
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life. Instead, agency is more about the authorship of one’s 
(individual or collective) path, given the opportunities, 
obstacles, language, and grammar that one’s social, cultural, 
and political contexts continually (and somewhat 
unpredictably) provide. 
Indeed, the “separate” system of gay and lesbian family 
law that this Part argues for—and which this Part explicitly 
links to the idea of gay and lesbian agency—will have to, under 
existing governmental structures, come into force through 
legislation passed by heterosexually-dominated state 
legislatures. This is unavoidable. That being said, the thought 
here is that gays and lesbians have the very real possibility of 
exercising a certain kind of political ownership over “domestic 
partnerships,” “civil unions,” or other forms of gay and lesbian 
relationship-recognition that any given state legislature might 
create. With this gay and lesbian ownership, significant gay 
and lesbian authorship of gay and lesbian law could follow—
perhaps informed by practice elsewhere, such as India, where 
the national Parliament is responsible for legislating and 
otherwise enabling (the bulk of) religious communities’ 
personal law, and these same communities have been able to 
exercise a great deal of say with respect to this legislation.157 
This would be agency, as this Part understands and uses this 
idea. 
More specifically, this would be American agency, and 
indeed this Part does not understand or use “agency” in a way 
that is de-linked from local context, which includes local 
imaginations of the possible. With respect to these local 
imaginations, in some contexts—including perhaps the 
contemporary United States—“[agency] is entailed not only in 
those acts that resist norms but also in the multiple ways in 
which one inhabits norms.”158 In other words, in some contexts, 
agency exists where one finds “submission to certain forms of 
(external) authority.”159 This being the case, this Part does not 
insist that gay and lesbian agency find expression in a system 
of relationship-recognition and family law that is completely 
different than majoritarian marriage and majoritarian family 
law. The “separate” system of gay and lesbian family law that 
this Part (following extant Californian practice) suggests, and 
  
 157 See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 121, at 109 (2000). But see WILLIAMS, 
supra note 132, at 98-99. 
 158 MAHMOOD, supra note 156, at 15. 
 159 Id. at 31 (emphasis added). 
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begins to sketch, is not intended to be different for difference’s 
sake. In fact, no pluralist system of law anywhere in the world 
functions in this facile way. Instead, the separate system of 
family law that this Part suggests is intended to provide a 
space160 from which gays and lesbians can argue for, and 
implement, a different set of norms than majoritarian ones if 
and when differences with the majority arise. Preserving this 
potential for difference is important for gay and lesbian agency 
and—as this Article understands the relationship between 
agency and dignity—gay and lesbian dignity. 
This Part proceeds in three sections. The first section 
shows, very generally, how one might see Proposition 8 in a 
positive light, by demonstrating how this allegedly anti-gay 
ballot initiative resulted in something that anti-gay activists 
have feared and railed against for some time now, namely 
“special rights” for gays and lesbians.161 Indeed, the fact that 
Proposition 8 effectively resulted in a successful initiative for 
gay and lesbian “special rights” signifies an important 
reworking of anti-gay activists’ political and legal agendas. 
Consequently, gay and lesbian activists would be remiss in not 
grappling with—and capitalizing on—this important shift in 
the legal and political terrain and the unprecedented 
opportunities for gay and lesbian agency (and dignity) that 
have opened up as a result of Proposition 8. 
Building on the first section’s re-reading of Proposition 8 
through the lens of “what your enemies do not want for you 
might very well be what you should want,” the second section 
of this Part begins to provide a more affirmative account of how 
parallel relationship-recognition regimes defend important gay 
and lesbian interests. With respect to these interests, this 
section first engages seriously with what ordinary gays and 
lesbians expressed about their needs after Proposition 8. As 
this section reads those needs, they included more agency vis-à-
vis the laws that govern gay and lesbian lives and families. 
  
 160 Jim Bohman argues in a similar vein when he writes that “sometimes 
separate jurisdictions can serve a public function, to the extent that they provide the 
public space needed for groups like Native Americans to have a more coherent and 
effective voice in the larger, civic public sphere.” James Bohman, The Moral Costs of 
Political Pluralism: The Dilemmas of Difference and Equality in Arendt’s “Reflections 
on Little Rock”, in HANNAH ARENDT: TWENTY YEARS LATER 53, 73 (Larry May & 
Jerome Kohn eds., 1996) (emphasis added). 
 161 For a history of the anti-gay use of the “special rights” terminology, see 
generally TINA FETNER, HOW THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT SHAPED LESBIAN AND GAY 
ACTIVISM 84-100 (2008). 
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After diagnosing this gay and lesbian desire for more agency 
with respect to the laws affecting gay and lesbian lives, this 
section moves on to diagnose and discuss in detail how this 
agency is threatened by gay and lesbian amalgamation into 
existing majoritarian marriage regimes in the United States. 
Like Part II’s discussion of the legal and political experiences of 
minorities around the globe and the desire for more agency 
that these experiences have given rise to, the discussion in this 
section similarly provides examples of (heterosexual) 
majoritarian indifference and/or hostility in the contemporary 
United States (as well as just across the border in Canada). 
Accordingly, in the same way that global minorities have 
sought both dignity and refuge via pluralist legal set-ups, this 
section suggests that such set-ups might serve as helpful 
templates for gay and lesbian action, and dignity, in the 
contemporary American same-sex marriage debates. In other 
words, this section argues that gay and lesbian relationship-
recognition politics in the United States should be a great deal 
less sanguine about the dignity that majoritarian marriage 
slyly promises, and why American gay and lesbian politics 
should be more receptive to learning from the politics and 
practices of legal pluralism elsewhere. 
The final section of this Part concludes by offering two 
specific suggestions of how gay and lesbian non-majoritarian 
relationship-recognition regimes might offer different—and 
better—alternatives to those provided by majoritarian 
marriage. While, as this Part has already discussed, it is not at 
all necessary for gay and lesbian agency that gay and lesbian 
relationship-recognition regimes be entirely different than 
majoritarian marriage, there are some distinct ways in which 
domestic partnership/civil union regimes might be structured 
in order to better demonstrate their distinct worth. In making 
these two particular suggestions—one concerning the 
nomenclature of gay and lesbian relationship-recognition 
regimes, and the other concerning the substance of such 
regimes—this concluding section will also be able to respond to 
two major concerns that contemporary same-sex marriage 
advocates will likely have about this Part’s arguments and 
proposals. These concerns are: 1) the alleged inability of the 
“domestic partnership” or “civil union” nomenclature to provide 
anything more than an inferior and insulting neologism in the 
face of the magical-realism of the word “marriage,” and 2) the 
restrictions on “choice” that are implicit in creating separate 
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relationship recognition regimes that are each available only to 
certain type of couples (e.g. same-sex versus opposite-sex). 
The conventional terrain over which the same-sex 
marriage debates are transpiring is creating serious 
impediments to gay and lesbian dignity. As a result, this Part 
attempts to re-conceptualize and reframe basic terms of 
reference in the same-sex marriage debates in order to advance 
gay and lesbian dignity. As this Part demonstrates, what looks 
like homophilia can very much be homophobia, and what looks 
homophobic can prove homophilic. That being said, this Part 
focuses less on the conceptual, legal, and political missteps of 
advocates for same-sex marriage—the homophobia of their 
brand of homophilia—than it does on the homophilia in others’ 
homophobia. At one level, then, the goal of this Part is to find 
homophilic opportunity in some of the ironies that have been 
opened up in a world where (ostensibly) homophobic initiatives, 
such as Proposition 8, are par for the course. More particularly, 
this Part means to demonstrate how same-sex “domestic 
partnerships” or “civil unions”—separate from opposite-sex 
“marriage”—can be dignity-enhancing for gays and lesbians. 
Indeed, they are not “separate but equal” institutions, but 
potentially “separate and better” ones. 
A. Special Rights and the Anti-Homophobic Promise of 
Proposition 8 
To begin to see how measures like Proposition 8 (and 
the plural relationship-recognition system that it returned 
California to) might align with gay and lesbian interests, 
because of the way that this measure resulted in special 
recognition of same-sex relationships, one need only examine a 
provision attached (ironically) to recent legislation banning 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the State of 
Connecticut. According to this 2005 addition to the General 
Statutes of Connecticut, nothing contained in the Connecticut 
anti-discrimination legislation shall be  
deemed or construed (1) to mean the state of Connecticut condones 
homosexuality or bisexuality or any equivalent lifestyle, (2) to 
authorize the promotion of homosexuality or bisexuality in 
educational institutions or require the teaching in educational 
institutions of homosexuality or bisexuality as an acceptable 
lifestyle, (3) to authorize or permit the use of numerical goals or 
quotas, or other types of affirmative action programs, with respect to 
homosexuality or bisexuality in the administration or enforcement of 
the [state’s antidiscrimination laws], (4) to authorize the recognition 
840 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:3 
of or the right of marriage between persons of the same sex, or (5) to 
establish sexual orientation as a specific and separate cultural 
classification in society.162 
The incredible fear that homosexuality might gain social 
credence as either a lifestyle or recognized cultural group is 
palpable in this recent legislative declaration.  
The fear that gays and lesbians might find benefit from 
or even want “special rights” is older than this recent 
Connecticut legislation might indicate. Indeed, before there 
was this Connecticut law (and before there was Proposition 8), 
there was Amendment 2, the infamous 1992 amendment to the 
Colorado State Constitution that declared that  
[n]either the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or 
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, 
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any 
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian 
or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall 
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class 
of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, 
protected status or claim of discrimination.163 
As is well known, Amendment 2 was challenged using 
the federal constitution in the U.S. Supreme Court, the result 
of which was the landmark Romer v. Evans decision.164 The 
terrain over which the legality of Amendment 2 was fought, 
both inside and outside of the Supreme Court, concerned 
whether Amendment 2 was an appropriate response to the 
supposed menace of “special rights” for gays and lesbians (and 
bisexuals). As the Supreme Court described it, “[Colorado’s] 
principal argument in defense of Amendment 2 is that it puts 
gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons. So, 
the State says, the measure does no more than deny 
homosexuals special rights.”165 
  
 162 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46A-81R (2005), repealed by R.B. 899, 2009 Gen. 
Assem., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009) (implementing the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health decision, recognizing marriages and relationships 
providing “substantially the same rights, benefits, and responsibilities entered into in 
another state or jurisdiction,” and providing for the merger of “existing civil unions into 
marriages” in Connecticut). 
 163 COLO. CONST. art. 2 § 30(b), invalidated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
 164 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 165 Id. at 626; see also Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, in which he writes: 
[A]ssuming that, in Amendment 2, a person of homosexual ‘orientation’ is 
someone who does not engage in homosexual conduct but merely has a 
tendency or desire to do so, Bowers still suffices to establish a rational basis 
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In its opinion, the Supreme Court disagreed with the 
State of Colorado, holding that Amendment 2 violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.166 In the 
process, the Court also found that it was not gay and lesbian 
people who were seeking legal peculiarity in Colorado, but the 
proponents of Amendment 2 themselves. Wrote the Court:  
[T]he amendment imposes a special disability upon [homosexual] 
persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that 
others enjoy or may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific 
protection against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of 
Colorado to amend the State Constitution or perhaps, on the State’s 
view, by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability. This is 
so no matter how local or discrete the harm, no matter how public 
and widespread the injury. We find nothing special in the 
protections Amendment 2 withholds.167 
The Connecticut legislature’s recent efforts to pre-empt 
an (alleged) gay and lesbian effort to be viewed as “special” is 
just the latest installment, then, in what has been a recurring 
theme in anti-gay polemics in the United States. Similarly, 
same-sex “marriage” can be viewed as the latest instance of gay 
and lesbian advocates explicitly (and fearfully) rejecting any 
mark of special-ness or distinction. Given the history of 
majoritarian pillorying of gays and lesbians for their allegedly 
constant attempts to seek special legal accommodation, 
Proposition 8’s creation of (or return to) a special relationship-
recognition regime for same-sex couples is extremely 
noteworthy. Indeed, given anti-gay fears of how gays and 
lesbians might fruitfully capitalize upon any sort of potential 
special recognition by the law, the fact that Proposition 8 and 
other measures actually create “special” parallel relationship-
recognition regimes for gay and lesbian persons deserves closer 
scrutiny and appreciation from advocates for gays and lesbians. 
Now may very likely be the time to re-examine the typical gay 
and lesbian urge to retreat into the majority.  
Of course, this will not be easy for such advocates, given 
the particular course that anti-gay stigmatization has taken in 
  
for the provision. If it is rational to criminalize the [homosexual] conduct 
[according to our Bowers precedent], surely it is rational to deny special favor 
and protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in the 
conduct. 
Id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  
 166 Id. at 635. 
 167 Id. at 631. 
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the United States for so long. For gays and lesbians in the 
United States, there have long been negative consequences 
associated with the claim that gays and lesbians seek “special” 
and unique privileges in an otherwise egalitarian America, and 
also with the corollary description of homosexuality as mere 
“lifestyle”168—the same “lifestyle” that the “rich and famous” 
always already enjoy.169 In response to this particular brand of 
anti-gay baiting, gay and lesbian advocates have typically fled 
from anything associated with either term.170 However, in the 
  
 168 This pejorative use of “lifestyle” can be found in many places including, as 
Douglas NeJaime has documented, the educational context. See Douglas NeJaime, 
Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for Differences Based on 
Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 303, n.139 (2009); see also 
ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(c)(8) (LexisNexis 1992) (requiring sex education program 
materials to “emphasi[ze] . . . in a factual manner and from a public health perspective, 
that homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general public and that 
homosexual conduct is a criminal offense under the laws of the state”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 15-716(c)(1)-(3) (1995) (prohibiting instruction that (1) “[p]romotes a 
homosexual life-style,” or (2) “[p]ortrays homosexuality as a positive alternative life-
style”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-32-30(A)(5) (2004) (prohibiting health education programs 
from discussing “alternate sexual lifestyles from heterosexual relationships including, 
but not limited to, homosexual relationships except in the context of instruction 
concerning sexually transmitted diseases”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 
§ 85.007 (Vernon 1999) (requiring education programs for persons eighteen-years-old 
and younger to “state that homosexual conduct is not an acceptable lifestyle and is a 
criminal offense”). 
 169 See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (Justice Scalia’s finding that 
homosexuals have “high disposable income”).  
 170 For example, in the Romer litigation, it became everyone’s objective in the 
litigation to flaunt their mundane, “un-special” credentials. Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion, for example, found that  
Amendment 2 confounds th[e] normal process of judicial review. It is at once 
too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then 
denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a 
class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is 
unprecedented in our jurisprudence. The absence of precedent for 
Amendment 2 is itself instructive . . . . It is not within our constitutional 
tradition to enact laws of this sort. 
Id. at 633. Justice Scalia’s minority, dissenting opinion argued the elite nature of both 
American homosexuals and their supporters: 
It is . . . nothing short of preposterous to call “politically unpopular” a group 
[e.g. homosexuals] which enjoys enormous influence in American media and 
politics. . . . When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be 
with the knights rather than the villeins—and more specifically with the 
Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the 
Court’s Members are drawn. 
Id. at 652. 
  As a result, whatever victory for gay and lesbian people that Romer’s 
outcome represented, the opinion’s silences and lapses also tell a story of equally-
important missed opportunities. Examining the history which led up to this state 
constitutional amendment, as well as the Supreme Court’s particular focus in this case, 
one finds the entire legal battle centered around the question of whether Amendment 
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process, they have arguably stymied consideration that they 
are akin to other sorts of “cultural” groups that might benefit 
from multiculturalist policies and the “protected status” (or 
even “quotas”171) that forms of multiculturalism can distribute 
to cultural groups. As a result of this pressure to culturally 
dissolve, and also politically disassociate from controversial 
social “re-engineering” plans, gay and lesbian activists have 
found it difficult to ask for (or even imagine the possibility of) 
strong remedies for discrimination that have been implemented 
(however unevenly or ineffectively) with respect to other 
discriminated-against groups.172 Affirmative action, for 
example, is one such remedy, and the surprise and debate—
both within and without the gay and lesbian community—that 
greeted Middlebury College’s 2006 announcement (later 
disavowed) that it would affirmatively act to admit openly-
homosexual students is but one example of this.173  
  
2’s eradication of Colorado municipal non-discrimination statutes (amongst other 
measures put into place in Colorado ensuring non-discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation) marked an end to “special-ness” and a return to equality, or whether this 
outcome itself created a state of exception and marked some people as legal “outlaws.” 
In other words, only Amendment 2’s silencing of gay and lesbian people’s “claims of 
discrimination” was dealt with in the case; the other parts of Amendment 2 which 
envisioned the possibility of giving gay and lesbian people “minority status, quota 
preferences, [and/or] protected status” were completely ignored. Indeed, most 
fundamentally, the debate in the case failed to ask, “What’s wrong with being 
‘special’?” 
 171 See text accompanying supra notes 162 and 163. 
 172 This is not to say that gays and lesbians are necessarily in the same 
position as discriminated-against racial and ethnic minorities in the United States, nor 
that gays and lesbians should imbricate themselves in all of the tropes and 
technologies relating to countering racial and ethnic discrimination (e.g. “separate but 
equal”) in the United States, but it is to say that “despite the adoption of a goal of civil 
rights, gay collective identity is at present closer in form to that of the white ethnic 
groups than to those of racial minorities. Movement away from a political 
consciousness based on white ‘ethnicity’ . . . might increase the gay movement’s 
capacity to pose a more fundamental challenge to the socio-sexual order.” Steven 
Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Constructionism, in FORMS 
OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY 
239, 291 (Edward Stein ed., 1990). 
 173 See Heather Schwedel, Pondering Affirmative Action for Gays, THE DAILY 
PENNSYLVANIAN, Oct. 30, 2006, available at http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian. 
com/media/storage/paper882/news/2006/10/30/News/Pondering.Affirmative.Action.For.
Gays-2409198.shtml, for an example of the confusion and debate that accompanied the 
supposed Middlebury College announcement; see also John Calapinto, The Harvey Milk 
School Has No Right to Exist. Discuss, N.Y. MAG., May 21, 2005, available at 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/features/10970/ (discussing liberal unease with 
educational admission policies that give preferential treatment to gay and lesbian 
students). See generally David Luc Nguyen, Taking Affirmative Action: Do Gays 
Deserve the Same Boost Into College as Racial Minorities?, Jan. 30, 2007, available at 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Taking+affirmative+action:+do+gays+deserve+the+sam
e+boost+into...-a0159593303. 
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Thus, as much as the contemporary gay and lesbian 
civil rights movement links itself to the civil rights struggles of 
before, an important disjuncture emerges with respect to the 
issue of group identity and group cohesiveness. This has 
important ramifications for the question of what to ask for 
legally and politically. The next section argues that gays and 
lesbians should not abandon the prospect of “special rights,” 
and the legal agency they can result in, especially where an 
unlikely opportunity to get both has finally presented itself in 
the form of domestic partnerships, civil unions, and the like. 
B. The Possibility of Claiming Special Rights and Dignity 
Gay and lesbian advocates’ fear of “lifestyle” and 
“special rights” allegations is real.174 However, this 
understandable fear need not be paralyzing. And, indeed, many 
ordinary gay and lesbian people viewed Proposition 8 not as a 
paralytic, total defeat, but as a spur for action. This section 
first demonstrates how gay and lesbian people in the United 
States, like other people around the globe, have recently been 
arguing for a great deal more agency vis-à-vis the laws that 
directly impact their lives and families. It then proceeds to 
show how the amalgamation of gays and lesbians into 
majoritarian marriage regimes threatens this agency. This 
discussion sets the stage for the next section’s exploration of 
how a more legally-pluralistic relationship-recognition system 
provides for gay and lesbian agency—and dignity—in ways 
that gay and lesbian advocates’ pursuit of majoritarian 
marriage has not, and cannot. 
In the aftermath of the Proposition 8 vote, many gays 
and lesbians expressed the feeling that the vote left them 
feeling powerless with respect to their destiny, in at least three 
different ways. First, many gay and lesbian Californian’s 
lamented the control that non-Californian, out-of-state forces 
seemed to have over the outcome of the vote. For example, 
Lorri Jean, CEO of the Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center 
publicly stated: 
We have been critical of all of the out-of-state conservative religious 
groups that made significant contributions to the campaign, 
including the Knights of Columbus National Headquarters in 
Connecticut and Focus on the Family in Colorado. But the truth is 
that the LDS church leadership in Utah specifically directed its 
  
 174 See, e.g., Cruz, supra note 15, for an articulation of this common fear. 
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membership to get involved with the Yes campaign in an 
unprecedented way—both in terms of volunteer time and dollars.175  
Second, as this statement by Jean simultaneously reveals, 
many gay and lesbian people felt that Proposition 8’s passage 
demonstrated how religious groups were dictating the laws of a 
secular state, which many gay and lesbian Americans clearly 
feel an especially strong (if secular) attachment to.176 Finally, 
and similarly, there were many gay and lesbian laments that 
the civil rights of a minority should not be dictated by the votes 
of a majority.177 
Agency, then, has been an important issue for many 
ordinary gay and lesbian people, even if it has been neglected 
by lawyers, judges, and academics in their discussions of the 
same-sex marriage issue. Taking this concern for gay and 
lesbian agency seriously, the rest of this section will highlight 
the ways in which a unitary relationship-recognition system 
  
 175 Lorri L. Jean, No on Proposition 8 Frequently Asked Questions, http://laglc. 
convio.net/site/PageServer?pagename=Prop_8_FAQ (last visited Jun. 12, 2009) 
(emphasis added). 
 176 See, e.g., AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, THE 
RELIGIOUS RIGHT’S WAR ON LGBT AMERICANS: CHURCH, STATE, AND YOUR FREEDOM AT 
RISK 1 (noting that Rev. Barry W. Lynn, executive director of Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, had previously commented on Proposition 8 by 
stating: “Allowing powerful religious groups to take away minority rights by referenda 
is fundamentally at odds with what America is about.”), available at http://www.au.org/ 
resources/brochures/the-religious-rights-war-on-lgbt-americans/lgbt-2009.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2010). For a more quotidian example of this sentiment, see Linda Morgan, 
Letter to the Editor, Church and State, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 25, 2008, at B4 (arguing that 
“[t]he separation of church and state is meant to prevent the use of state power to 
enforce the religious views of any particular group on society as a whole. It is, in fact, 
the proponents of Proposition 8 who are seeking to compel all of us to abide by their 
vision of right and wrong.”). 
 177 See, e.g., Jennifer Harper, Inside the Beltway, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2009, 
at A7 for a quote by Geoff Kors, executive director of Equality California, stating his 
belief that “people’s lives should never be put up for a popular vote. Civil rights for 
minority groups should be decided by the sound reason of the legislature and the 
courts—not by the will and whims of the majority.”; see also Frank Rich, Op-Ed., The 
Bigots’ Last Hurrah, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, § WK, at 10, for this acerbic 
commentary:  
Some [same-sex marriage] opponents grumbled anyway [after the Iowa 
Supreme Court decision legalizing same-sex marriage], reviving their 
perennial complaint, dating back to Brown v. Board of Education, about 
activist judges. But the judiciary has long played a leading role in sticking up 
for the civil rights of minorities so they’re not held hostage to a majority vote.  
Finally, Stuart Milk, nephew of Harvey Milk, has recently proclaimed that “[t]aking 
away a civil right we had is a violent act. . . . As Harvey would say, when you let the 
majority deprive the minority of their civil rights, you start a shopping list. . . . Who is 
next?” See Meredith May, Rally in Castro on Eve of Prop. 8 Hearing, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 
5, 2009, at B1. 
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threatens this agency, in order to set the stage for the next 
section’s specific (yet preliminary) suggestions for how a 
pluralist system might do things (somewhat) differently and 
(very likely) better. 
Again, the best place to begin to understand how gay 
and lesbian agency is threatened by a unitary marriage regime 
for one-and-all is the California Supreme Court’s recent same-
sex marriage decision. In this respect, the California Supreme 
Court, while discussing the nomenclature politics of 
relationship-recognition, opined that  
because of the long and celebrated history of the term “marriage” 
and the widespread understanding that this word describes a family 
relationship unreservedly sanctioned by the community, the 
statutory provisions that continue to limit access to this designation 
exclusively to opposite-sex couples—while providing only a novel, 
alternative institution for same-sex couples—likely will be viewed as 
an official statement that the family relationship of same-sex couples 
is not of comparable stature or equal dignity to the family 
relationship of opposite-sex couples.178 
Distilling the California Supreme Court’s opinion here, 
then, one learns that, in California, there is apparently one 
community (“the community”), which for a long time has 
“unreservedly” endorsed an unchanging, universally 
understood (i.e., “well-understood”) institution known as 
“marriage.” 
One might worry that the monolithic, “transcendent”179 
vision of marriage painted by the California Supreme Court 
here—and, later, by the Connecticut Supreme Court180—is a 
decidedly un-secular one. Not only is there an undeniable 
shade of sectarian monotheism coloring this vision of 
marriage—the single, indivisible god here being “marriage” 
itself—but also, at times, an outright religiosity presents itself 
in these opinions. Discussing the nature of marriage, for 
example, the Connecticut Supreme Court wrote: 
[T]he following observation of Connecticut Catholic Conference, Inc., 
which filed an amicus brief in support of the defendants, is relevant. 
“In our culture, there has been a consensus on . . . [the] unique 
ethical foundations [of marriage]: that the union should be for life 
(permanency), that the union should be exclusive (fidelity), and that 
  
 178 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 179 See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 418. 
 180 Id. 
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the love that sustains and nurtures the union should be 
characterized by mutual support and self-sacrifice (selflessness).” 
These ideals apply equally to committed same sex and committed 
opposite sex couples who wish to marry.181 
Thus, here one finds a secular court quoting a religious 
brief in support of an antiquated vision of (heterosexual) 
marriage.182 It would seem to be a small step between this kind 
of religious influence on secular marriage and the type of 
religious influence on secular government that many gays and 
lesbians protested in the aftermath of Proposition 8.183 To the 
extent that one is worried about gay and lesbian agency in one 
context, one might also be worried about it in the other. 
  
 181 Id. at n.76 (quoting Brief of Connecticut Catholic Conference, Inc. as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellees at 11, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2007) (No. 17716)). Of course, this is also a sectarian 
observation. With respect to divorce, there has been and remains intense disagreement 
between Catholics and Protestants over the availability of religious divorce, and both 
Christian traditions have serious objections with aspects of Muslim divorce law. 
 182 It should be noted that once one puts this Connecticut opinion side-by-side 
with the California Supreme Court’s opinion, one has two high courts describing 
marriage in a way that appears as monolithic and impervious to change as the 
description of marriage put forward by advocates working to keep the institution 
heterosexual. When this latter set of advocates cite “the historic and well-established 
nature of th[e opposite-sex] limitation [for marriage] and the circumstance that the 
designation of marriage continues to apply only to a relationship between opposite-sex 
couples in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the United States and around 
the world,” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 450, they do so in order to accuse their 
adversaries of trying to “redefine” the (single possible) definition of “marriage.” Id. at 
470 (Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting). For both (ostensibly pro-gay) advocates 
and (anti-gay) opponents of same-sex marriage, then, there can only be one type of 
marriage for “the” single community that supposedly comprises the polity. Given these 
(unnecessarily-inflated) stakes, one can perhaps better appreciate the intensity of the 
conflict between the two sides. 
  See also these additional comments by Justice Baxter:  
The bans on incestuous and polygamous marriages are ancient and deep-
rooted, and, as the majority suggests, they are supported by strong 
considerations of social policy. Our society abhors such relationships, and the 
notion that our laws could not forever prohibit them seems preposterous. Yet 
here, the majority overturns, in abrupt fashion, an initiative statute 
confirming the equally deep-rooted assumption that marriage is a union of 
partners of the opposite sex. The majority does so by relying on its own 
assessment of contemporary community values, and by inserting in our 
Constitution an expanded definition of the right to marry that contravenes 
express statutory law. 
Id. at 463 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added). Of course, this 
statement ignores the fact that “incestuous” is a notoriously difficult term to define, 
and may or may not include first-cousin marriages. Given this reality, and the fact that 
there are surely people who are California citizens who, for religious or secular reasons, 
believe in polygamy (and “incest”), the assertion here of one society—”our society”—is 
truly a hegemonic move. 
 183 See supra note 176. 
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Similar concerns about the possibility of gay and lesbian 
agency vis-à-vis majoritarian marriage can be raised in the 
aftermath of another same-sex marriage judicial decision, 
though one that did not uphold same-sex marriage rights. 
Specifically, in a recent (2006) opinion, Hernandez v. Robles, 
New York’s highest court argued the existence of a persisting 
connection between marriage and hetero-sex. Explaining its 
decision to uphold the traditional legal definition of marriage in 
that state, the New York court emphasized that marriage was 
for heterosexuals, and heterosexuals only, because 
“[h]eterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to 
the birth of children; homosexual intercourse does not. . . . 
[Same-sex] couples can become parents by adoption, or by 
artificial insemination or other technological marvels, but they 
do not become parents as a result of accident or impulse.”184 In 
other words, marriage is important as a social prophylactic 
when the condom breaks.  
This judicial decision, and ones like it,185 is indicative of 
the hold that majoritarian (heterosexual) concerns and 
priorities presently have, and will likely maintain, over the 
institution of marriage in the United States.  
While the New York court ultimately used these 
majoritarian concerns and priorities to deny gay and lesbian 
access to the institution of marriage, it seems likely that such 
majoritarian concerns will motivate the future direction 
(including potential regression) of marriage even if gays and 
lesbians are allowed to “marry” the intimate partner of their 
choice.  
 If such a concern seems preposterous, one only has to 
examine what happened in Canada after the introduction of 
same-sex marriage rights there in 2005. In two recent cases,186 
  
 184 Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 359, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (2006). See 
generally Kenji Yoshino, Op-Ed., Too Good for Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 14, 2006, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/14/opinion/14yoshino.html. 
 185 See Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 
(Ariz. 2003); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Conaway v. 
Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 216-17 (N.J. 2005); 
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 982 (Wash. 2006).  
 186 P. (S.E.) v. P. (D.D.), [2005] 50 B.C.L.R.4th 358 (Can.); Thébeau v. 
Thébeau, [2006] 302 N.B.R.2d 190 (Can.). A focus on troubling, recent developments in 
Canada is especially appropriate here because of the way previous scholarly work has 
attempted to use Canadian experience to argue the unalloyed benefits of extending 
marital regimes to same-sex couples in the United States. See, e.g., Mark E. Wojcik, 
The Wedding Bells Heard Around the World: Years From Now, Will We Wonder Why 
We Worried About Same-Sex Marriage?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 589, 636-47 (2004); Renée 
M. Landers, A Marriage of Principles: The Relevance of Federal Precedent and 
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Canadian provincial high courts have held extra-marital same-
sex conduct to constitute “adultery” for purposes of the Divorce 
Act.187 Under the historic Divorce Act, both “adultery” and 
“cruelty” constituted the sole fault grounds for divorce.188 
However, neither term is defined in the Act and, given the 
historically opposite-sex nature of marriage, it might seem that 
the former term necessarily involves opposite-sex intimacy.189 
As the British Columbia Supreme Court summarized the then-
present law of “adultery” in its 2005 opinion, P. (S.E.) v. P. 
(D.D.), “[a]lthough there is some uncertainty in the common 
law as to the precise definition of adultery, until now the courts 
in Canada have generally said that the act of adultery is 
between persons of the opposite sex.”190  
Nonetheless, in this case, the British Columbia 
Supreme Court deemed it necessary to “incremental[ly] 
change” this definition of adultery. It did so, noting that it took 
parliament’s [recent] enactment of the Civil Marriage Act to be a 
legislative statement of the current values of our society [that is] 
consistent with the Charter [and which we are] obliged to use as a 
guide to [our] consideration of the current common law definition of 
adultery. Individuals of the same sex can now marry and divorce and 
the common law would be anomalous if those same-sex spouses were 
not bound by the same legal and social constraints against extra-
marital sexual relationships that apply to heterosexual spouses.191 
While deciding to apply the pre-modern heterosexual 
offence of adultery to homosexuals in this case, the court 
declined to define what specific acts of same-sex intimacy 
would constitute “adultery,” given that historical case law on 
this point seemed to primarily concern penile-vaginal contact.192 
  
International Sources of Law in Analyzing Claims for a Right to Same-Sex Marriage, 
41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 683, 703-05 (2007). 
 187 Canada Divorce Act, R.S.C., ch. 3 (1985). 
 188 No-fault divorce is also available if “the spouses have lived separate and 
apart for at least year immediately preceding the determination of the divorce 
proceeding and were living separate and apart at the commencement of the 
proceeding.” Id. 
 189 This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that, historically as well, 
“engag[ing] in a homosexual act” provided a separate fault ground for divorce. See P. 
(S.E.) v. P. (D.D.), [2005] 50 B.C.L.R.4th 34 (Can.) (citing Canada Divorce Act, R.S.C. 
ch. 24 (1967-68)). This provision was removed in 1985, leaving “adultery” and “cruelty” 
as the sole fault grounds for divorce. See id. at 4. 
 190 Id.  
 191 Id. at 16-17. 
 192 But see Orford v. Orford, [1921] 45 O.L.R. 15 (Can.) for a case where 
“artificial insemination, without the consent of the husband” was held to constitute 
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What parts of the male anatomy might have similarities to the 
vagina (in the case of male-male “adultery”), and what parts of 
the female body might be considered a penis (in the case of 
female-female “adultery”), the court explicitly declined to say. 
Indeed, the bashful court noted that such graphic explicitness 
would be neither “necessary [n]or desirable.”193 
As Part II discussed, the inability of majoritarian 
institutions to take into account non-majoritarian interests—
much less find it “necessary or desirable” to do so—is one major 
reason why non-majoritarian peoples around the world have 
sought refuge and dignity outside of such institutions. With 
this in mind, this Article has proposed that a new goal for gay 
and lesbian people in the United States should be the 
imagination and legislation of a separate, more-homosexually-
centered family law and relationship-recognition system. 
Indeed, the goal should not be a “separate but equal” system, 
but a “separate and better” one, the latter determination 
derived in part from the democratic-pedigree of the process 
behind this system’s formulation and its tight responsiveness 
to the people who will be specifically bound by it. 
“Domestic partnerships” or “civil unions” provide one 
way out of the majoritarian problem. This is not to say that 
they provide the only way out, or necessarily the best way out 
forever, but they do represent a crucial beginning of the 
solution for America’s odd (and ironic)194 incapacity to envision 
more than one possibility of the good intimate life, or to engage 
with family law pluralism in a sustained and rigorous manner. 
The existence and continuing development of legal alternatives 
to majoritarian marriage should be encouraged. Domestic 
partnerships and civil unions can be conceived of, not as a way-
station on the road to majoritarian marriage, but as a way to 
avoid majoritarian marriage altogether. 
The next section concludes this Part by discussing how 
one might further develop and improve the separate and 
  
adultery because it involved “the possibility of introducing into the family of the 
husband a false strain of blood.” See also P. (S.E.) v. P. (D.D.) at 8-10. 
 193 P. (S.E.) v. P. (D.D.) at 18. 
 194 The ironies here are manifold, but one of the most interesting is the 
disconnect between a general American obsession with ensuring freedom generally, yet 
American paranoia with respect to sexual freedom particularly. See JANET R. 
JAKOBSEN & ANN PELLEGRINI, LOVE THE SIN: SEXUAL REGULATION AND THE LIMITS OF 
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, at ix (2003), for an attempt to understand “why the high value 
set on freedom in the United States comes crashing to the floor when it comes to sex. If 
freedom is such an important value in American life, then why isn’t sexual freedom a 
mainstream American value too?”  
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(arguably) better system of domestic partnerships and civil 
unions that has gained traction in the United States, including 
in its most populous state (California). The following 
necessarily consists only of musings at the minimum, and 
suggestions at the most, as the particular features of this 
system should be left to the results of a future gay and lesbian 
community-oriented discussion and debate.195 The proposal 
here, after all, is a self-consciously democratic one. That being 
the case, two relatively specific recommendations will be 
advanced, namely that 1) gay and lesbian relationship-
recognition schemes could use a different—and better—
nomenclature than “domestic partnership,” “civil union,” and 
(also) “marriage,” and 2) gay and lesbian relationship-
recognition schemes should work to facilitate greater gay and 
lesbian freedom and agency (as opposed to something called 
“choice”) by avoiding further legal entrenchment of pre-modern 
(heterosexually-authored) “sex offenses” such as adultery, 
infidelity, fornication, and the like. 
C. Suggestions/Concerns 
Any proposal for homosexual-authored and homosexual-
respecting family law is likely to face only tepid (if any) support 
by traditional gay and lesbian (same-sex marriage) advocates. 
Their reaction will likely come back to arguments rehearsed in 
the California and Connecticut supreme courts, focusing on the 
alleged indignity of “separate but equal.” Part II raised serious 
doubts about the correctness of these universally-oriented 
claims, however, using transnational experience. This 
transnational experience holds several potential (and perhaps 
conflicting) lessons, but this Part has focused on one that is 
particularly relevant in a post-Proposition 8 U.S., namely the 
dignity—read as including a robust notion of agency—that can 
blossom by building and maintaining different family law 
systems for different types of people. 
This concluding section builds on this basic (but 
nonetheless neglected) observation by exploring what a dignity-
enhancing family law system for gay and lesbian people—one 
that is distinct from the troubled marital (and divorce) system 
that heterosexuals have built for their own purposes and 
  
 195 As well as future academic research and commentary by myself and others. 
I consider this Article to be at the beginning of a much longer engagement by myself 
with the issues and ideas raised herein.  
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needs—might look like. In doing so, this section responds, in a 
more concrete fashion, to a concern about nomenclature which 
sits at the heart of gay and lesbian advocacy organizations’ 
“separate but equal” claims. This section also responds to a 
somewhat more inchoate worry about the bona fides of 
restricting people from exercising a “choice” to enter into 
marriage, even if an equally (or even better) endowed 
alternative—for example, domestic partnership or civil union—
is available to them. 
Before beginning each of these particular discussions, 
several observations and clarifications are (again) in order. 
First, while in some respects this Article’s proposal of the 
creation of a “separate and better” system of family law for gays 
and lesbians in the United States is a radical proposal, in many 
other respects it is just what remains to be worked out in the 
aftermath of Proposition 8 and similar measures. Even before 
Proposition 8, and before the legalization of same-sex marriage 
in California, gay and lesbian advocates in California had 
successfully argued for and helped legislate a separate system 
of relationship-recognition for same-sex couples that was 
broadly protective of such couples. Something similar happened 
in Connecticut (now replaced by a marriage regime for both 
opposite- and same-sex couples), and something similar now 
exists in New Jersey,196 Nevada,197 Oregon,198 and Washington 
state.199 While many people in California and elsewhere have 
viewed such separate systems as stepping stones towards 
(same-sex) marriage, recent events have demonstrated that it 
is far from certain that these struggles will actually end in 
marriage. Seen in this light, this Article’s proposal is rather 
banal in its acknowledgment of present realities, though 
  
 196 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28(d) (West 2007) (“Those rights and benefits 
afforded to same-sex couples under the Domestic Partnership Act should be expanded 
by the legal recognition of civil unions between same-sex couples in order to provide 
these couples with all the rights and benefits that married heterosexual couples 
enjoy.”). 
 197 See Human Rights Campaign, Nevada Marriage/Relationship Recognition 
Law, http://www.hrc.org/issues/1285.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2010). 
 198 H.B. 2007, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 2(5) (Or. 2007) (“Sections 1 to 9 
of this 2007 Act are intended to better align Oregon law with the values embodied in 
the Constitution and public policy of this state, and to further the state’s interest in the 
promotion of stable and lasting families, by extending benefits, protections and 
responsibilities to committed same-sex partners and their children that are comparable 
to those provided to married individuals and their children by the laws of this state.”). 
 199 WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.015 (2010) (“It is the intent of the legislature 
that for all purposes under state law, state registered domestic partners shall be 
treated the same as married spouses.”).  
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admittedly it is radical to the extent that its proposal views 
gays’ and lesbians’ contributions to American discourses of sex, 
friendship, and family to be profound, insightful, and more 
worthy of emulation than much of what else has come to pass 
for common sense in the United States. 
Second, while the suggestions below map out differences 
from the majoritarian marital regime that a separate gay and 
lesbian relationship-recognition regime might adopt (after 
democratic deliberation), this is not to suggest that any such 
regime must be completely different than what has come to 
pass before in order for this regime to prove its dignity/agency 
credentials. A separate system of family law is agency-
enhancing because it provides a space from which to argue for 
a different set of norms than majoritarian ones if and when 
differences with the majority arise. I repeat that a separate 
system is not intended to be different for difference’s sake, and 
no pluralist system of law anywhere in the world functions in 
this facile way. To the same extent that American federalism 
retains its value even as the 50 different states often adopt the 
same laws and policies, and to the same extent that Christian 
personal law in India retains its value even as it shares a 
disavowal of polygamy with Hindu personal law, so too does 
the separate system of relationship-recognition for same-sex 
couples outlined here retain its value even as it overlaps with 
heterosexual norms and practices. Indeed, even if gays and 
lesbians (in a particular state) chose to call their relationship-
recognition system something like “same-sex marriage,” 
despite the arguably more-attractive nomenclature options 
presented below, this nomenclature overlap with opposite-sex 
“marriage” still preserves for the future—in the legal 
separateness of its regime—the possibility of difference, either 
with respect to nomenclature or other aspects of family law. In 
an era of increasingly strident right-wing American politics, 
this potential is not only worth fighting for, but very likely 
requisite. 
Third, the proposal for “separate and better” family law 
for gays and lesbians presented here is different than proposals 
put forward by Nancy Polikoff and similarly-minded activists 
and scholars.200 Polikoff’s work,201 in which she has developed an 
  
 200 See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 
75 TEMP. L. REV. 709, 710-12 (2002); BeyondMarriage.org, Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: 
A New Strategic Vision for All Our Families and Relationships, http://beyondmarriage. 
org/full_statement.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2010). 
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approach to family law that she calls “valuing all families,”202 is 
extremely important. Such an approach recognizes that  
[i]n every area of law that matters to same-sex couples, such as 
healthcare decision making, government and employee benefits, and 
the right to raise children, [non-marital] laws already exist in some 
places that could form the basis for just family policies for those who 
can’t marry or enter civil unions or register their domestic 
partnerships, as well as for those who don’t want to or who simply 
don’t.203 
For Polikoff, such non-marriage-premised laws could be 
expanded in number and scope, as an alternative to merely 
pursuing and further entrenching the current practice of 
handing out healthcare, employment, and parental rights 
solely through the institution of marriage—whether opposite-
sex or same-sex.204 The desirable goal, under Polikoff’s 
approach, would be “[l]aws that value all families,” i.e. laws 
which “ensur[e] that every relationship and every family has 
the legal framework for economic and emotional security,” and 
not (more) laws which merely “legitimate[] gay relationships 
that mirror marriage.”205 
Clearly, this Article shares in Polikoff’s desire to de-
center the role that marriage attempts to play for all people in 
contemporary American life. However, this Article’s proposals 
differ from Polikoff’s in that its proposals are simultaneously 
more realistic than Polikoff’s, and more radical. This “realistic 
radicalism” recognizes, like Polikoff, the need to start 
someplace else than “the package of rights that marriage gives 
different-sex couples and [merely] work[ing] down from 
there.”206 Instead, the goal should be something like, as Polikoff 
describes it, “identifying the needs of all LGBT people and 
work[ing] up from there to craft legislative proposals to meet 
those needs.”207 However, this Article’s discussions are also 
motivated by a very realistic recognition that “marriage”—and, 
indeed, “family” itself—are extremely centrifugal terms in 
contemporary American political life, ones which have 
  
 201 The fullest statement of Polikoff’s beliefs can be found in her most recent 
book. See generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF, supra note 6. 
 202 Id. at 5.  
 203 Id. at 9. 
 204 See id. 
 205 Id. at 210. 
 206 Id. at 209. 
 207 Id. 
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effectively—time and time again—subverted the possibility of 
radical “family values.” In fact, they occasionally work to 
subvert the radical possibilities of Polikoff’s own work.208 
This being the case, a new public vocabulary—including 
a new nomenclature for same-sex relationships specifically—
might very well be required to achieve the re-imagination of 
family values that both Polikoff and this Article desires. It is 
with this hunch, and for this reason, that this Article suggests 
a very public, and very political, and very “separate” system of 
gay and lesbian “family” law. Indeed, while “private ordering” 
of family law does contribute to increased agency, the 
suggestions presented here are not oriented towards further 
privatizing family law. In fact, they are much more oriented 
towards the “personal law” systems of family law which are 
found presently in locations as diverse as India and California. 
Separate (and better) systems of law for homosexuals—
differing (to some degree) from majoritarian marriage in both 
nomenclature and substance—would not only help highlight 
and politicize homosexual lives, homosexual families, and 
homosexual family law,209 but also heterosexual lives, 
  
 208 For example, Polikoff apparently considers it important, in order to “value 
all families,” to provide a mechanism for unmarried partners (whether homosexual or 
heterosexual) to inherit wealth and property from one another in an orderly and 
predictable manner upon a partner’s death. See id. at 184-89. One might wonder, 
however, whether a more-progressive move would be to altogether re-think unstated 
(yet powerful) norms that sanction the private transfer of (large amounts of) resources 
between dead and living members of a “family.” The practice of inheritance is such a 
fundamental part of the law of “marriage” and “family,” however, that it seems 
doubtful whether either institution—whether valued or de-valued—can really allow for 
any profound re-imagining (or eradication) of it.  
 209 For this reason, I am in disagreement with some of the positions expressed 
by Marc Poirier in his recent, thoughtful work on the nomenclature issue. See Marc R. 
Poirier, Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the “Civil Union” / “Marriage” 
Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2009). Poirier writes that  
to deploy “civil union” and “marriage” properly requires everyone involved in 
interactions where these names are to be used to identify the couple as same- 
or different-sex. The mere fact of imposing a nomenclature distinction is 
problematic. . . . The law’s provision of a separate name serves to perpetuate 
microperformances and microidentifications of [the previously stigmatized 
category of “gay.”] 
Id. at 1437. Putting aside (for the time being), the issue of whether the law should be 
encouraging microperformances of “acting straight,” any time any person seeks any 
type of recognition from the state, this interaction inevitably results in some loss of 
privacy. To (voluntarily) identify as “married” almost inevitably raises the question for 
the state (as well as employers, friends, and acquaintances): “To whom?” In this way, 
one might say that everyone (homosexual or heterosexual) who identifies as “married” 
is engaging in, at least in part, a flamboyant “coming out.” As Kenji Yoshino has 
stated: “I’m sometimes asked . . . whether I consider same-sex marriage to be an act of 
covering or flaunting. I think it is both.” KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN 
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heterosexual families, and heterosexual family law. Indeed, 
such a proposal firmly puts the “majoritarian” into that which 
now simply passes as “marriage.”210 
Finally, a demurrer: For reasons of space, this section 
will not discuss how to actually procedurally operationalize a 
democratically-minded, (gay and lesbian) community-oriented 
legislative scheme. There are many questions to ponder in this 
respect. For example: Who counts as part of “the community”? 
How does one assess the community’s sentiments on any given 
proposal? To do so, would one return to the same gay and 
lesbian advocacy organizations which have sought alignment 
with majoritarian practice in the first place? To legislate, would 
one have to rely on the unpredictable votes of state legislators 
who don’t belong to “the community”? These are difficult 
questions, and this Article raises them to provide no conclusive 
answers. However, that being said, they are also questions that 
can only be raised in the event that gays and lesbians see a 
dignified alternative to majoritarian marriage in the first 
instance. This Article’s primary goal is to raise the possibility 
of this alternative, as a starting point to a much longer gay and 
lesbian community-oriented discussion involving these 
additional questions, if and when they should arise. 
1. Nomenclature 
One aspect of any future same-sex relationship-
recognition regime(s) that will generate public interest 
concerns what these same-sex relationships will be called by 
the state, and how to ensure dignity with this choice in 
  
ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 91 (2006); see also Poirier, supra, at 1488 n.375 (briefly 
acknowledging the difficulty that same-sex partners will have in hiding their 
homosexuality from the public even if they were legally-entitled to identify themselves 
as legally “married”). 
  Moreover, the existence of a new kind of relationship such as “civil union” 
or “domestic partnership” puts a great deal—and unprecedented amount—of onus on 
heterosexuals to account for their decisions to “marry.” In this way, heterosexuality 
becomes (micro)politicized in a way which previously only homosexuality was (by 
heterosexuals). In other words, with the advent of distinct forms of state relationship-
recognition for homosexuals, heterosexuals’ microperformances and 
microidentifications would now become greatly magnified.  
 210 Here I am somewhat echoing the views of Cheshire Calhoun, when she 
argues that debates concerning the possibility of same-sex marriage are so disturbing 
for many heterosexuals because these debates shine light on the heterosexual desire 
for “heterosexual love, marriage, and family [to] have a uniquely prepolitical, 
foundational status in civil society.” CHESHIRE CALHOUN, FEMINISM, THE FAMILY, AND 
THE POLITICS OF THE CLOSET: LESBIAN AND GAY DISPLACEMENT 127 (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
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nomenclature. Indeed, nomenclature appears to be the most 
crucial issue for a great number of people (whether 
heterosexual or homosexual) involved in the American same-
sex marriage debates, overshadowing even (seemingly) 
important discussions about the substantive rights and 
responsibilities attaching to any potential same-sex 
relationship-recognition regime. The California Supreme Court 
described the importance of the issue of a nomenclature in the 
following noteworthy passage: 
[I]t . . . is significant that although the meaning of the term 
“marriage” is well understood by the public generally, the status of 
domestic partnership is not. While it is true that this circumstance 
may change over time, it is difficult to deny that the unfamiliarity of 
the term “domestic partnership” is likely, for a considerable period of 
time, to pose significant difficulties and complications for same-sex 
couples, and perhaps most poignantly for their children, that would 
not be presented if, like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples were 
permitted access to the established and well-understood family 
relationship of marriage.211 
Echoing this concern with same-sex relationship 
nomenclature, Ronald Dworkin has recently written, in a 
widely-noted essay, that with respect to marriage and the 
debate over same-sex “marriage” versus “civil unions”: “We can 
no more now create an alternate mode of commitment carrying 
a parallel intensity of meaning than we can now create a 
substitute for poetry or for love.”212 
Dworkin’s claim, many people have felt, is a powerful 
one.213 It is also one that opens up a broader discussion about 
the possibility of re-signifying terms. This is a large topic, to be 
sure, but something must be said here and, most bluntly, it is 
that Dworkin’s claim and ones like it largely work to obscure 
  
 211 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 445-46 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 212 Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 
2006, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19271 (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). 
 213 A recent crop of law review articles specifically addressing the 
nomenclature issue, and concluding that a different nomenclature for same-sex 
relationships is problematic, is evidence of the interest in this issue and also that most 
liberal thinkers broadly agree with Dworkin’s conclusion here. See, e.g., Courtney 
Megan Cahill, (Still) Not Fit to be Named: Moving Beyond Race to Explain Why 
‘Separate’ Nomenclature for Gay and Straight Relationships Will Never Be ‘Equal,’ 97 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 1155 (2009); Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: 
Language and Status in Family Law, 85 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1351133; Poirier, supra note 209, 
at 1437. 
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(and dishonor) the history of the gay and lesbian civil rights 
movement.  
This movement is one that has spoken the “love that 
dare not speaks its name,” one that has made “gay” 
synonymous with both homosexuality and happiness, and one 
which has organized marches around the world every summer 
attesting to the “pride” that (many) gays and lesbians possess 
despite living in a world that desires to shame them. More 
generally, the gay and lesbian civil rights movement has been 
one that has demonstrated vividly the protean quality of words 
and labels—including “family,” “queer,” and even “sex”—and 
the alchemic potential of any ambitious politics of 
nomenclature.214 It is also a movement that has managed to 
convince many heterosexuals to stop using the gendered terms 
“husband” and “wife,” or even the term “spouse,” and instead 
use the term “partner” to describe their “significant others.” In 
other words, despite the claims of Dworkin and like-minded 
others, neologisms can take hold, and the “disempowered” can 
change the terms of power’s discourse—sometimes quite 
literally. 
It would appear to be the case, then, that if gays and 
lesbians could seize the opportunities which now attach to 
having “their own” family law in jurisdictions as populated and 
influential as California, New Jersey, and elsewhere, they 
would have a great deal of potential to change not only the 
vocabulary surrounding their own relationships, but also that 
surrounding relationships more broadly.  
It is the case that “domestic partnership” and “civil 
union” are old terms, from another era, and arguably boring. 
As the epigraph to this Part suggests, they are also too 
suggestive of some of the domesticating aspirations and 
requirements of these current institutions.215 That being the 
  
 214 Indeed, one can view the insistence by mainstream gay and lesbian civil 
rights organizations and activists that “marriage” is the proper province of secular 
states, instead of churches and temples, see supra note 176, and their insistence that 
“marriage” can incorporate fertile, same-sex couplings—just as readily as it can sterile, 
opposite-sex couples—as a further testament to the general tendency of the larger gay 
and lesbian civil rights movement to believe in the possibility of challenging not only 
the conventional meaning of conventional words, but also what words should be used 
conventionally in the first place. 
 215 See also Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1772-
74 (2005) for the observation that  
[f]or good, as well as for ill, marriage now licenses couples to structure their 
lives as best suits them without losing recognition for their relationship. . . . 
[A] marriage certificate now allows heterosexual couples to have an open 
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case, (re)claiming gay and lesbian ownership of these separate, 
same-sex relationship-recognition regimes, and then acting 
upon that ownership, could create real opportunities for a more 
exciting and less sterile nomenclature. The possibilities with 
respect to this nomenclature are relatively boundless and do 
not have to remain static and stale like “marriage” itself. Given 
this Article’s focus on dignity, one useful suggestion to 
contemplate might be that if gay and lesbian people want 
dignity, then they should give up the indirect pursuit of that 
through “marriage” and, instead, directly pursue that dignity 
by working to rename their state-recognized relationships as 
“dignity.” Indeed, with this name chosen by gays and lesbians 
for a gay and lesbian-authored family law institution, the 
contrast could not be more clear or more poetic: gays and 
lesbians would now enter into “dignity” while heterosexuals 
would enter into “marriage.”216 
2. “Choice” 
The above nomenclature suggestion not only highlights 
the exciting opportunities for new relationship nomenclatures 
that a more pluralistic system of relationship-recognition 
permits, but also the way in which “marriage” itself 
increasingly possesses an uncertain valence in the 
contemporary United States.217 Quite a bit of the contemporary 
legal discussion on “marriage” versus “domestic partnership” 
and “civil union” has rhetorically and simplistically distorted 
the (ostensibly positive) valence that marriage holds in today’s 
United States. While it might be possible (if unlikely) that gay 
and lesbian Midas-like magic can re-signify and revive the 
flagging fortunes of the term “marriage,” it is very unlikely that 
  
marriage, to live in different cities or in different apartments in the same 
city, to structure their finances as they please, without having their 
commitment or the legal benefits that follow from it challenged. . . . [In 
contrast, t]he requirements of actual cohabitation in a shared residence and 
commingled finances are quite typical of most domestic partner registries. 
 216 One important objection to this suggestion might be that calling any sort of 
relationship “dignity” implies that people outside of that relationship—for example, 
single people who are gay or lesbian—are “undignified.” I believe this objection is a 
legitimate one, though one potential response might be that the contemporary notion of 
dignity is a relatively universal and capacious value/trait and that it does not admit, 
conceptually at least, of its (potential) converse. In other words, there might be no 
dignified way, in our contemporary world, to treat someone with indignity or view them 
as undignified. 
 217 See Abrams & Brooks, supra note 4, at 1. 
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gay and lesbian votes will ever be able to reform the legally-
defined institution of majoritarian marriage, or other areas of 
family law linked to it. And whatever gains in dignity that gays 
and lesbians may accrue (and impart to others) by entering 
into “marriage” will very likely be outweighed by the loss of 
agency that gay and lesbian people will experience with respect 
to the definition and democratic legislation of laws that govern 
gay and lesbian lives and families. 
This loss of agency that attaches to any gay and lesbian 
absorption into majoritarian marriage highlights the odd 
character of arguments that have been made about an alleged 
right to choose to “marry.” These kinds of arguments, explicitly 
about something characterized as “choice,” pop up here and 
there in the contemporary debates over same-sex marriage. For 
example, in Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court characterized the right at stake in that case as “the right 
to marry—or more properly, the right to choose to marry.”218 
This concern for “choice” will also likely make itself heard as an 
objection to this Article’s suggestion of a “separate and better” 
relationship-recognition regime for same-sex couples, the 
objection being that same-sex couples should—no matter 
what—have the right to “marry.” 
While this section has already addressed the (perhaps 
surprising) compatibility of same-sex “marriage” with “separate 
and better” family law for gays and lesbians, it is nonetheless 
worth addressing some of the troublesome implications of the 
particular kind of “choice” arguments that some same-sex 
marriage advocates are making presently, in the process 
drawing out some of the important differences between these 
implications and those emanating from this Article’s particular 
suggestions. 
In this respect, it is worth stating again that “choice” is 
an odd terrain over which to argue marriage rights. As Nancy 
Polikoff has astutely observed, “marriage would be a real 
choice”219 if it were not so completely bound up with so many 
personal and social necessities (e.g. family and medical leave to 
take care of a sick marital partner).220 As Polikoff even more 
  
 218 Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957 (Mass. 2003). 
 219 POLIKOFF, supra note 6, at 133. 
 220 For similar reasons, Ruthann Robson calls marriage “compulsory.” See 
Robson, supra note 200, at 777. 
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clearly states: “marriage is not a choice if it is the only way to 
achieve economic well-being and peace of mind.”221 
Nonetheless, contemporary same-sex marriage 
advocates are using this vocabulary of “choice” in their 
advocacy of same-sex marriage rights. And these advocates 
often seem to be understanding this “choice” to be embodying 
some sort of libertarian-utopia-like vision of a right to choose 
the nomenclature of one’s state-recognized relationship. It is 
for this reason, indeed, that this Article anticipates “choice”-
premised objections to its suggestion for a “separate and better” 
relationship-recognition regime for non-majoritarian unions. 
These objections would arise especially if some gay and 
lesbians who wanted to “marry” were not able to do so because 
the gay and lesbian community, as a whole, in a given state, 
had decided to use their delegated right to designate the 
nomenclature for their state-recognized unions in a manner 
such that gay and lesbian unions would be called something 
other than “marriage.”  
This libertarian formulation of “choice,” however, is 
hard to understand, not least because the same advocates who 
endorse a right to choose “marriage” nomenclature for one’s 
relationship do not intend to extend that general right to all 
people—including, most notably, those involved in polygamous 
relationships.222 While perhaps such advocates would respond 
that, while they believe it inappropriate to extend the 
substantive rights, privileges, and burdens of marriage to 
polygamous groupings, they actually have no problem with the 
state merely recognizing polygamous “marital” unions, this 
complete bifurcation between the nomenclature and the 
substance of state relationship-recognition would be odd, not 
only as a matter of extant law,223 but also with regards to same-
sex marriage advocates’ own goals. At the very least, it would 
open the door for (perhaps anti-gay) proposals to allow same-
sex “marriages” but also to restrict the substantive benefits 
that accompany this particular form of “marital” recognition.224 
  
 221 POLIKOFF, supra note 6, at 133. 
 222 See supra text accompanying note 152; see also Robson, supra note 200, at 771. 
 223 This is not to deny that a more libertarian-like right to choose “marriage” 
nomenclature might (or should) develop, but it is to say that this right—in this 
formulation—does not presently exist. In fact, states routinely criminalize the 
conducting of “marriage” ceremonies both of and by unauthorized persons. See, e.g., 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.202(c)-(d) (Vernon 2009). 
 224 See Homer, supra note 149, at 516 (envisioning how “[e]ach benefit 
associated with marriage is susceptible to an analysis of the public policy that 
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“Choice” arguments, as they presently stand, are then not well-
formulated: they do not stand on any deep foundation of extant 
United States legal practice and, furthermore, some 
formulations of these arguments actually open the door to 
forms of legal mischief that same-sex marriage advocates 
would themselves find troubling. 
Moreover, anti-gay mischief is certainly afoot when 
arguments for more “choice” to enter into majoritarian 
marriage result in less agency for gays and lesbians with 
respect to laws that will deeply influence gay and lesbian lives 
and families. Indeed, it would seem that the right of “choice” is 
something different than the right to choose the laws that will 
heavily influence one’s life path. In other words, it seems that 
“choice” is something that exists in a great deal of tension with 
agency. 
As the Canadian example has demonstrated, more gay 
and lesbian “choice” can result in less gay and lesbian freedom, 
especially to the extent that gay and lesbian absorption into 
majoritarian marriage results in the application of pre-modern 
sexual morality norms—for example, the “sex offenses” of 
adultery, infidelity, fornication, and the like—to gays and 
lesbians. Canada has witnessed such misadventures with its 
recent application of the pre-modern (heterosexual) sex offense 
of adultery to (married) same-sex couples.225 In the far more 
conservative and increasingly reactionary United States, the 
consequences of extending heterosexual traditions to 
homosexuals could be far more devastating. As Steven Homer 
has noted, to the extent that the availability of same-sex 
marriage gets linked, like opposite-sex marriage, to the “right 
to have sex, . . . [sexual morality] may easily turn on the 
married-unmarried distinction, leaving unmarried gays and 
lesbians with no sexual privacy. This would introduce into gay 
culture, for the first time, the concept of pre-marital sex.”226 
This cannot be what dignity absolutely requires.  
  
underlies it. Thus, to the extent that a court can find that a particular benefit does not 
belong to the class of benefits that make a couple married but rather reflects state 
recognition of the idiosyncracies of heterosexuality, that benefit can be denied to same-
sex couples.”). 
 225 See supra text accompanying notes 187-190. 
 226 Homer, supra note 149, at 513. 
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CONCLUSION 
Dignity may be a universal human aspiration, but its 
attainment is complicated by the messiness of human history 
and the richly textured quality of both what is and what can be 
imagined in any given locality. 
The issue of imagination is thus central to the debate 
over legal pluralism and dignity. As this Article has discussed, 
because of the way anti-gay discourse has been configured for 
so long in the United States, it is very difficult for gays and 
lesbians to view themselves, in any positive way, as comprising 
a relatively distinct lifestyle or cultural grouping. “Special-
ness” becomes conflated with “queer” and the history of 
homophobia with which that term is associated. Social and 
legal arguments then tend to congregate around claims that 
homosexuals are “just like” heterosexuals, and that the two 
groups must be treated exactly the same both for the purposes 
of equality and dignity. 
This has certainly been the recent view of both the 
California and Connecticut Supreme Courts. For these courts, 
gay and lesbian dignity is compromised by family law 
pluralism. This Article has attempted to demonstrate, however, 
that an alternative way of imagining the connection between 
dignity, legal pluralism, and marriage is available. It has also 
hopefully ignited the imagination of those people who are 
interested in developing “separate and better” gay and lesbian 
alternatives to majoritarian (heterosexual) marriage. 
These alternatives should be developed by gay and 
lesbian people through a truly democratic debate and process. 
The political and legal agency for gay and lesbian people that 
will accompany such a process is an important component of 
reinforcing the dignity of gays and lesbians. Proposition 8 was 
a difficult piece of legislation to swallow, but it does not have to 
spell the end of gay and lesbian dignity. That dignity was 
always there and, if anything, it just needs to be re-discovered. 
That being said, this re-discovery may have to happen by 
traveling to very unfamiliar places. This Article has hoped to 
facilitate that journey. 
